LEGAL ARGUMENT, ISSUE FRAMING, AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAW ON THE SUPREME COURT by Hensley, Jonathan
Abstract 
Title of Dissertation:  LEGAL ARGUMENT, ISSUE FRAMING, AND THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAW ON THE 
SUPREME COURT 
 Jonathan B. Hensley, Doctor of Philosophy, 2015 
 
Dissertation Directed By: Dr. Wayne McIntosh 
 Department of Government and Politics 
 
     Supreme Court advocates seek to influence the Supreme Court through the arguments 
made in briefs filed with the Court. This dissertation examines the extent to which language 
used in attorneys’ briefs is adopted by the Supreme Court, and whether the arguments made 
by attorneys affect the content and outcome of Court decisions. I focus on the Court’s 
campaign finance jurisprudence, as the focus on a particular area of law allows the tracing of 
language related to similar issues over time. 
 In Chapter Two, I demonstrate that the Court’s campaign finance decisions can be 
divided into four eras that are distinguishable by the Court’s relative deference or skepticism 
toward legislative determinations regarding campaign finance regulation. Chapter Three 
examines instances in which justices have changed their minds on important issues and 
searches for evidence that arguments in briefs influenced these changes, but finds that there is 
little evidence that these changes can be directly attributed to arguments found in briefs. 
 Chapter Four examines legal argument through issue framing, analyzing the issue 
frames employed in both court opinions and attorney’s briefs. I conclude that the four eras of 
campaign finance law can also be distinguished by differences in issue framing. I further 
conclude that advocates can affect the way the Court views an issue by adding new frames at 
the Supreme Court level that were not present in the lower courts, especially in the 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
This dissertation examines how legal language develops over time, both in Supreme 
Court opinions and in the briefs filed with the Court setting forth legal arguments. My 
ultimate goal in this study is to determine whether the arguments made by advocates affect 
the outcomes or the content of Supreme Court opinions. A great deal of literature, which is 
reviewed extensively below, has dealt with the role of advocacy in the Supreme Court. This 
study extends the existing literature both in its substantive conclusions and in its methods.  
My analysis focuses on the Supreme Court’s campaign finance cases. I begin by 
theorizing that the Court’s cases on this subject can be divided into four distinct eras, and 
provide evidence that the Court’s voting patterns differed in these eras. I then analyze cases 
in which justices have changed their positions on certain issues, and look for evidence that 
legal arguments made by attorneys in briefs were adopted by the Court and affected the 
justices’ changing positions. In the last substantive chapter, I turn to framing theory to 
analyze the linguistic similarity between briefs and opinions in particular cases. Framing 
analysis focuses on the use of related groups of phrases in a document in order to highlight 
certain aspects of an issue. The use of framing theory further my analysis of the differences 
between time periods in the Court’s use of language. This type of analysis, using differences 
in language to characterize different time periods, is a new addition to the literature on legal 
advocacy and legal argument. I also employ framing theory to determine whether advocates 
are adding new issue frames at the Supreme Court stage, or simply using the same frames 
established in the lower court, and find evidence that advocates are successful at influencing 
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the way the Court frames its decisions in certain key cases. 
The use of framing analysis, and the coding of documents based on frames they 
employ, allows me to compare the ways in which different documents characterize various 
legal issues—the way they argue. This is an important contribution to the literature on legal 
advocacy, because the goal of attorneys is to influence courts through their legal arguments.  
Accordingly, I can characterize both briefs and opinions by the issue frames they employ, and 
determine to what extent the language they are using is similar.  
Review of the Literature 
Every year, thousands of pages of briefs are filed with the Supreme Court.  These briefs come 
from both parties and amici curiae, and some cases attract dozens of amici in addition to the 
original parties.  Parties further attempt to persuade the Court through oral argument.  The 
result is a massive information stream flowing from advocates to the Supreme Court.  
Advocates present their arguments in the hope that they will persuade the justices to vote 
“their way” and even that the arguments themselves will be adopted by the court.  I am 
interested in both of these advocacy goals in this project.  Can advocates persuade justices to 
change their minds on an issue?  To what extent do advocates shape the language of the law? 
To what extent do court opinions reflect the language of briefs filed in the case?  And do 
advocates have the opportunity to influence the development of a body of doctrine over time?  
The influence of a particular argument is hard to trace, unless the justices explicitly cite it, or 
unless we have access to the justice's materials that note the influence of particular briefs.  
However, we can detect to what extent language from briefs finds its way into opinions.  
Regardless of the outcome of a case, the reasons given for a decision matter, since they will 
shape future cases, and thus shape what it is possible for advocates to achieve and for future 
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courts to do.  In the words of one legal academic critiquing political science research which 
focuses primarily on case outcomes, “[c]ase outcomes rarely tell us anything about the rule in 
the case, and what matters for law especially in appellate courts, is the rule.”  (Friedman 
2006, p. 276). 
 Legal change occurs for a variety of reasons:  changes in Supreme Court personnel, 
who bring different judicial philosophies and political ideologies to their work; the issues that 
are brought before the court (although the court has discretion as to which cases it takes, it's 
not up to the court what issues are appealed to it); and new issues brought about by a change 
in the political landscape, such as the passage of major new legislation that is challenged in 
the courts.  Legal change is reflected in doctrinal changes and these doctrinal changes are 
expressed in the decisions written by courts, so the impact of the Court's decisions go far 
beyond who wins or loses a case.  An example comes from the recent Citizens United case, 
which could have been decided for the plaintiff on narrow grounds, but instead ushered in 
major changes in campaign finance law.  Similarly, the Supreme Court's recent decision in 
D.C. v. Heller not only ruled the District of Columbia hand gun ban unconstitutional, but in 
doing so declared that the Second Amendment is meant to protect an individual right to bear 
arms, and specifically rejected the “collective right” theory of the Second Amendment.  The 
actual language used in both of these decisions, and not just their result, will influence the 
way lower courts treat cases addressing these topics.  Additionally, there is increasing 
evidence they will influence the Court's own future decisions.  Even if the Court does not 
mechanically adhere to precedent as in the traditional “legal model” described by political 
scientists, the precedent created by the Court at one time constrains what it can do at another 
time. (Kritzer and Richards 2002; Bailey and Maltzmann 2008, 2011).  
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 This project builds on and extends two existing, and related, bodies of literature:  that 
on judicial behavior, and that on advocacy by parties and amici.  One of the central questions 
examined by both these bodies of literature is whether law matters in judicial decision-
making.    Empirical political scientists addressing this question have often been highly 
skeptical of the importance of law in judicial decision-making. (Segal and Spaeth 1993 and 
2002).  On the other hand, the historical institutionalist tradition, found in both the legal 
academy and some departments of government or political science, generally takes law and 
the norms and culture of the legal profession more seriously (Gillman and Clayton 1999). 
 Many quantitative social scientists have argued that legal arguments are nothing more 
than post-hoc justifications for justices' policy preferences, or in strategic terms that they 
represent compromises between justices who may disagree somewhat on the outcome of the 
case, and are shaped to get “swing” justices to join a coalition.  (The latter view does not 
necessarily imply that law does not matter, but political scientists who see judicial decision-
making as driven by policy might argue that “compromise” legal positions might reflect this 
kind of strategic formulation in order to advance justices' policy goals within the constraints 
of a collegial court, rather than reflecting true legal principle).  However, the last couple of 
decades have seen empirical scholars increasingly taking the law seriously, from Epstein and 
Kobylka (1992), up through more recent efforts by Richards and Kritzer (2002), Brandon 
Bartels (2009), Bailey and Maltzmann (2008, 2011), and Wedeking (2010). 
 With regard to the content of opinions, it should be noted that in one sense, it does not 
matter whether the Justices are persuaded by arguments, or use arguments as post-hoc 
rationalizations for their own ideological or policy preferences.  Either way, the justices must 
use legal language to justify their decisions, and they are aware that it matters what language 
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they use, in the sense that lower courts will be bound by the precedent they create.  Thus, it is 
important to understand whether advocates are successful in shaping the language of legal 
opinions, because by doing so, they are in effect shaping the outcome of the case with regard 
to legal doctrine, even if they do not influence which party wins or loses a particular case.  
 In addition to the body of literature on judicial decision-making, a number of scholars 
have examined how advocacy affects Supreme Court decisions.  This work has examined 
both parties and amici curiae as influences on judicial decision-making, including their 
influence on both the cert stage and the merits stage of cases.  Most of this work has fallen 
into two categories:  it either examines the influence of advocacy on the court's decision as to 
whether to rule for the respondent or petitioner (Collins 2008), or it examines the influence of 
advocacy on the content of Court opinions.  (Corley 2008).  The limitation of the latter type 
of work, however, is that it is typically examines only a single Court term or a span of a few 
years. (Corley 2008).  In order to comprehend the effects of advocacy on legal doctrine, it is 
necessary to consider more than single case or a single Court term, and to follow the 
development of law over time.  I propose to examine the changes in a particular legal area 
over time, and whether, and to what extent, legal advocacy contributed to those changes.  
This approach does not assume that advocacy is the only, or even the primary, factor in legal 
change.  Changes in court personnel and political environment are also likely to bring about 
legal change.  However, the Supreme Court relies heavily on other actors (case parties and 
amici) for information, and a change in court personnel alone will not result in legal change 
unless advocates take advantage of these personnel changes.   
 In order to understand the role of advocacy in legal change, I will focus on legal 
change in a particular area, the Supreme Court's campaign finance jurisprudence.  To perform 
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the kind of detailed tracing of legal change I propose, it is necessary to narrow the focus to a 
particular issue area, since change is not uniform across different areas of the law.  On the 
one hand, this method has the disadvantage of being less generalizable than a broader 
examination of the Court’s jurisprudence; on the other hand, it captures more nuance and 
detail regarding legal change, because it is not limited to a short time period encompassing 
only a few Supreme Court terms.  Furthermore, focusing on a single area of the law allows 
the study to focus on particular legal arguments and doctrinal shifts that would be difficult to 
capture in a broader study.   
Campaign finance law makes an especially good subject area for this study for a 
number of reasons.  First, it includes several complex constitutional issues which are the 
focus of a variety of legal arguments.  This is also an area in which judicial ideology is likely 
to play a role, so it provides an opportunity to determine if legal advocacy plays a role even 
in an ideologically charged subject area.  The court has also decided at least twenty-four 
campaign finance cases in the modern era, beginning with United States v. UAW-CIO, 352 
U.S. 567, (1957).  This provides a large enough sample of opinions and briefs that gradual 
development of the law over time may be observed.  Finally, the campaign finance cases 
involve a variety of organized interest groups as parties and amici curiae, and thus, 
potentially, a wide variety of legal arguments.  This is a particularly high-stakes legal area for 
many interest groups, since the results of these cases in the courts affect their activities in the 
legislative arena.  Campaign finance law is an area of law with important policy implications, 
as is readily apparent from the growth of money in American electoral politics since the 
decision in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). Additionally, campaign finance is worth 
treating as its own distinct area of legal doctrine.  While campaign finance law is a hybrid of 
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other areas—election law and First Amendment Law most importantly--it cannot be fully 
understood by examining these other areas of law outside the campaign finance context.  
Thus, the development of this body of law in itself is worth studying, both for its intrinsic 
importance to policy, and for the extent to which it has attracted a number of competing legal 
arguments. 
In order to trace legal change over time, I will first characterize the evolution of 
campaign finance law over time according to both the Court’s issue votes and its use of 
language.  I will then turn to examining specific campaign finance cases in which Supreme 
Court justices cast unexpected votes and closely examine whether legal advocacy played a 
role in the Justices’ decisions.  I will then use content analysis, assisted by linguistic analysis 
software, to detect patterns in the Court's adoption of language from briefs filed by both 
parties and amici addressing the merits of the case.  Parts of this analysis rely on issue 
framing theory, while other parts focus on discrete legal arguments. 
 
The Role of Legal Argument in Judicial Decision-Making in the U.S. Supreme Court 
 There are at least three primary theories concerning the effects of legal precedent on 
Supreme Court decision-making, and under each model, judges would approach legal 
arguments differently.   The legal model holds that precedent is the most important factor in 
judicial decision-making, even to the point of overriding justices' own preferences (Knight 
and Epstein 1996).   In this case, arguments made by litigants, provided they cite relevant 
precedent, ought to be highly influential.  Additionally, arguments grounded firmly in 
precedent will be more likely to be accepted than those made on policy or other grounds. 
 The attitudinal model of judicial decision-making holds, in contrast to the legal 
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model, that justices' decision-making is meant to maximize their own policy preferences (J. 
Segal and H. Spaeth 2002).  Under this model, justices craft their opinions using the 
arguments that supported their already existing policy preferences; the arguments, in other 
words, are only post-hoc rationalizations for decisions that are made by other criteria.   
 Finally, an intermediate position is that held by Epstein and Kobylka (1992).  In 
trying to understand how legal change occurs, they find that changes in court personnel and 
political environment, among other factors, influence legal change, but ultimately find that 
change cannot be accounted for completely apart from law and legal arguments.  While not 
completely agreeing with the most traditional form of the legal model, they do find that the 
“language of the law . . . arguably channels and constrains judicial choices.”  (Epstein and 
Kobylka 1992, 12).  According to this theory, the arguments made by litigants play an 
important role in explaining judicial decision-making and legal change. 
 While strategic models of court decision-making might be grouped separately, they 
share with the attitudinal model the orientation that sees justices as primarily interested in 
making what they see as good policy (Epstein and Knight 2000).  However, strategic models 
do not necessarily imply a particular view about justices' adherence to precedent.  The same 
is true of interpretive-historical analyses of the court, which can incorporate various views on 
the motivations for judicial decision-making, and do not imply a particular view of how the 
court treats precedent.   
 If legal change cannot be explained without reference to legal arguments, it is 
important to understand the relationship between arguments and change, including what 
types of arguments are successful, and the process by which what counts as an acceptable 
argument changes over time.  The process must be viewed from the point of view of those 
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considering the arguments and making decisions (judges) and those making the arguments 
and trying to influence those decisions (litigants). 
The following sections outline relevant literature concerning judicial decision-making 
and legal change, in order to situate this project within the existing research in this area. 
 
Judicial Decision-Making and the Force of Argument 
 Within political science, the dominant view of U.S. Supreme Court decision-making 
has been that Supreme Court justices are primarily motivated in their decisions by policy 
goals (Baum 1997).  The most forceful and influential proponents of this view are Segal and 
Spaeth, in their seminal works The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model  (1993) and The 
Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model Revisited (2002).  Segal and Spaeth (2002) point to 
the difficulty faced by those who argue for the importance of precedent, and therefore legal 
argument, in judicial decision-making, when they note that adhering to precedent can often 
not be distinguished from a judge following his or her own pre-existing preferences.  If 
precedent is “an influence on decisions, it must achieve results that would not otherwise have 
obtained.”  (J. Segal and H. Spaeth 2002, 290).  While Segal and Spaeth do not deny that 
precedent sometimes causes justices to make decisions in conflict with their own preferences, 
they deny that justices prefer precedent over their own views to an extent that is “systematic 
and substantively meaningful.” (2002, 294).  Using a sample of all “landmark cases” (those 
listed as “major decisions” in the Congressional Quarterly's Guide to the U.S. Supreme 
Court), and a sample of “ordinary” or non-landmark decisions, Segal and Spaeth concluded 
that stare decisis has minimal influence on Supreme Court justices, and that the justices 
policy preferences prevail in their decisions to cast votes on the merits of cases.  Further, in 
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comparing landmark constitutional cases with landmark statutory cases, they find less 
adherence to precedent in the statutory cases, which is the opposite of what is to be expected, 
considering that statutory cases are often “lower stakes” than constitutional cases, and the 
Court knows its judgment in statutory case is subject to override by Congress (2002). 
 Additionally, Segal and Spaeth (2002) consider whether judicial attitudes drive 
decision-making only in the most politically salient cases.  Noting that, since roughly 1937, 
civil liberties cases have become more important on the Supreme Court's agenda than 
economic cases, they investigate whether attitudinal behavior is greater in civil liberties cases 
from 1937 through the Rehnquist Court.    They find that, in landmark cases, precedent has 
no significantly different effect in economic cases than in civil liberties cases.  On the whole, 
they find that where precedent does have an influence, it is primarily in “low salience” cases, 
i.e., “ordinary” as compared to “landmark” cases.  Furthermore, within the category of 
“ordinary” cases, precedential behavior is stronger among statutory cases (compared to 
constitutional cases) and among economic cases (compared to civil liberties cases) (2002).  
With regard to ordinary cases, these are the findings that are to be expected according to the 
traditional model in which precedent plays a central role in judicial decision-making.  In 
landmark cases, however, precedent appears to play little, if any role, in any category. 
 Close analysis of the types of arguments used by Supreme Court justices in their 
opinions has also provided some support for the attitudinal model.  In two articles analyzing 
the arguments made by Justices William Brennan and William Rehnquist, Gates and Phelps 
(Gates and Phelps 1996; Phelps and Gates 1991) found that, while the two justices advocated 
the use of different types of arguments, their tendency to reach results matching their 
ideological view was greater than their actual reliance on any one mode of argumentation.  
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As Baum (1997) points out, both of these justices were generally regarded to hold strong 
ideological positions, so it is not surprising these positions appear to influence their 
jurisprudence.  An analysis which investigated a greater number of justices, and including 
some who are less ideologically extreme, might yield different results.  Nevertheless, Gates 
and Phelps' studies show the value of closely examining legal arguments when attempting to 
understand judicial decision-making. 
 The attitudinal model presents a serious challenge to traditional claims regarding the 
importance of precedent and legal argument in judicial decision-making.  However, a number 
of scholars have pointed out the shortcoming of the attitudinal model.  Knight and Epstein 
(1996) consider the interaction of precedent and policy preferences, by examining the actual 
content of attorneys' briefs, judicial opinions, and the court's appeals to precedent during 
conference.  They conclude that, while policy preferences matter, precedent serves as an 
important constraint on judicial decision-making.  While each justice has a preferred outcome 
in a particular case, they also take the norms of stare decisis seriously.  Accordingly, instead 
of merely voting their preferences, they take into account existing precedent and the 
preferences of other justices, and modify their positions if necessary, with the goal of 
reaching a court decision that is as close as possible to their favored outcome.  (Epstein and 
Knight, 1996).   
 Additional evidence that more than policy preferences matter comes from Epstein and 
Kobylka (1992), who made a detailed study of change in the Supreme Court's rulings on the 
death penalty and abortion.  They examined three primary factors that ought to drive legal 
change—the court itself, “political environment” (which encompasses both public opinion 
and institutional actors), and interest group pressure.    Abortion and the death penalty made 
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particularly good objects of study, since they were both areas in which significant change had 
occurred in a relatively short amount of time.  On the whole, Epstein and Kobylka's findings 
point to the importance of legal argument as a factor in legal change.  
 Epstein and Kobylka define legal change as “a court created shift in (or reversal of) a 
particular prevailing legal doctrine.” (1992, 5).  The two issue areas chosen underwent this 
type of change in a relatively short period of time.  The change was especially short in the 
case of the death penalty, where the Supreme Court in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 
(1972), ruled Georgia's procedures for imposing the death penalty unconstitutional; a mere 
four years later, the Court upheld the constitutionality of the death penalty in Gregg v. 
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) after the rules for its imposition had been revised.  With regard 
to abortion, the court famously up held the right to abortion in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 
(1973).  However, sixteen years later in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 
490 (1989), the court undercut (though it did not explicitly overturn) Roe by allowing the 
states more freedom to regulate abortion.   
 In tracing legal change in these areas, Epstein and Koblyka (1992) find that factors 
such as political climate, or the types of groups participating in litigation, or the change in 
court personnel, offer insufficient explanations for legal change. In the case of the death 
penalty, for example, while there was some change in court personnel between Furman and 
Gregg, two members of the Furman majority, Justices Stewart and White switched sides in 
between cases.  A third justice in the Gregg majority, John Paul Stevens, has, since Gregg, 
written opinions indicating his opposition to the death penalty, so it seems unlikely he did not 
have at least some sympathy to the anti-death penalty side at the time Gregg was argued.  
Epstein and Kobylka follow the argumentative strategy of the NAACP Legal Defense Fund, 
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the organization that spearheaded the anti-death penalty litigation in both these cases, and 
found it to be lacking.  Rather than argue for reversal of the death penalty based on both 
broad constitutional grounds, and more narrow grounds that might have offered an alternative 
reason to overturn the defendant's death sentence, the LDF assumed the Furman decision 
meant the Court had accepted the unconstitutionality of the death penalty.  In reality, 
however, the LDF attorneys overlooked the fact that changes in the Georgia death penalty 
law had removed the due process concerns that led to the Furman decision, and failed to 
adjust their argument to those changed circumstances.  The authors also cite skilled amici 
arguments by Solicitor General Robert Bork (who did recognize the limitations of the Court's 
anti-death penalty holding in Furman) in favor of the death penalty's constitutionality.   
 Epstein and Kobylka, not surprisingly, argue that legal change cannot be explained 
merely by change in court personnel.  They point out that Brown v. Board of Education, 347 
U.S. 483 (1954), was decided by justices who were “not appointed by presidents with an 
overwhelming commitment to the demise of Jim Crow,” (Epstein and Kobylka 1992, 302), 
and their detailed tracing of the change in the death penalty and abortion help make their case 
that, while other factors matter, “it is the law and legal arguments as framed by legal actors 
that most clearly influence the content and direction of legal change.”  (Epstein and Kobylka 
1992, 8).   
 More recent work has also provided strong support for the importance of legal 
arguments in judicial decision-making.  Collins (2008) studied the influence of amici curiae 
briefs on the Supreme Court, and found evidence that the justices consider the arguments in 
the briefs, even those briefs they disagree with.  Collins examined, separately, the influence 
of conservative and liberal briefs in the Court from 1946-2001.  Using a probit model which 
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included the number of conservative and liberal amicus briefs filed in each case, Collins 
found that, when the number of briefs in a particular ideological direction increases, it has a 
statistically significant effect on the probability of a justice (even on whose ideology is 
opposed to that of the brief) casting a vote in the direction of those amici briefs.  For the most 
part, both liberal and conservative justices responded to the arguments of liberal amicus 
briefs.  Those justices in the extremely liberal ideological range responded less strongly to 
conservative briefs, but even they responded somewhat to them; the briefs' influence was 
muted, but not eliminated.  With regard to conservative briefs, Collins found similar results 
for most justices, with the exception of the three ideologically extreme conservative justices:  
Rehnquist, Scalia, and Thomas.  (Collins notes that Spaeth (2005) has referred to Rehnquist 
as the “poster child” for the attitudinal model.)  (Collins 2008, 109).  On the whole, Collins' 
findings show that, with a few exceptions, attempts at legal persuasion made a difference on 
the Supreme Court.  Ideology attenuates the effect of legal argument, but, with the three 
exceptions noted above, it does not eliminate it. 
 
Decision-Making from the Top Down and Bottom Up 
 Both Epstein and Kobylka (1992) and Collins' (2008) work point to the existence of 
what Collins terms “bottom up”, as opposed to “top down,” decision-making in the Supreme 
Court.  In top-down decision-making, justices seek a conclusion that accords with their 
policy preferences, seize on the arguments that support it, and ignore or downplay those that 
do not.  In a bottom-up process, however, justices consider all the evidence before them, and 
may even try to suppress their own policy preferences so as to not be unduly influenced by 
them.  Their goal is to “reach the most legally correct answer.”  (Collins 2008, 175).  None of 
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this suggests that justices' attitudes do not matter, or even that they are not the primary 
influence on decision-making.  It does mean, however, that there is evidence that most 
justices engage in good faith attempts to consider arguments opposed to their own policy 
preferences, and can sometimes be persuaded by them. 
 This is not to say, of course, that legal change comes only from the bottom up, as top 
down change is also possible.  First, the certiorari process gives the Court enormous 
discretion over which cases it hears; thus, not only does the court have great power in setting 
its own agenda, but it effectively sets the agenda of other courts below it (Perry 1994).  
Occasionally, the court even decides on its own that particular issue has not been adequately 
addressed (or addressed at all) by the parties, and that the case needs to be rebriefed or 
reargued, as occurred with Citizens United v. FEC.   
 Finally, the Supreme Court, as well as other courts, are potentially loci of judicial 
entrepreneurship, providing judges with the opportunity to promote ideas that interest them 
(McIntosh and Cates 1997).  Accordingly, when looking for new legal arguments that may 
become influential, we should look not only to briefs, but to legal opinions.  Even when a 
judge holds a position not shared by his colleague, the opinion writing process offers a 
chance for him to share his idea with other judges and attorneys, through the authorship of 
concurring and dissenting opinions.  While the Supreme Court offers the most potential 
influence on other courts, and thus the most obvious opportunity for legal entrepreneurship, 
federal circuit courts and state supreme courts also offer opportunities for enterprising judges 
to promote new ideas (McIntosh and Cates 1997).  
 Considering the potential for change to come from both judges and litigants, the 
process of legal change is properly understood as a complex interaction of “top-down” and 
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“bottom-up” forces.  A Supreme Court decision at time X (let us call it “Case X”), for 
example, may set the stage for a ruling on a related issue at time Y (“Case Y”), but litigants 
must determine how the rulings of Case X apply to Case Y, and make the appropriate 
arguments to convince the court that they should prevail.  While the personnel profile of the 
court certainly sets the stage for which arguments will be acceptable, there is more than one 
argument or sets of arguments that might be accepted by any particular set of justices.  A 
detailed example of this is provided by Kassop's (1993) analysis of the arguments in Casey v. 
Planned Parenthood, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).  The opinion in Casey reflects the interaction of 
arguments with policy preferences.  Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter (and Blackmun 
and Stevens, who concurred in the result), upheld the state regulations at issue that 
potentially made obtaining an abortion more difficult.  They also adopted the “undue burden” 
standard for regulation of abortion, rejecting the more stringent “strict scrutiny” approach of 
Roe v. Wade.  Nevertheless, they also claimed they were upholding Roe.  The “undue burden” 
standard had been articulated by Justice O'Connor in earlier abortion opinions, but not 
explicitly adopted by a majority of the Court, which had rejected Roe's strict scrutiny 
standard without replacing it with a new standard. The Third Circuit ruled in Casey that the 
“undue burden” standard was now the correct standard to be applied, since that standard 
commanded a plurality of Justices and was the narrowest grounds on which a plurality could 
be found.  Already to this point, a combination of top-down and bottom-up factors can be 
identified.  The Court had rejected the central holding of Roe, a “top down” change, but the 
ambiguity concerning the applicable standard left open an opportunity for “bottom up” 
change.  Advocates from both sides recognized this as an opportunity to determine whether 
Roe would be upheld, and what the standard for abortion regulations ought to be.  The 
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appellate court, faced with ambiguity, was forced to do its best to interpret the Court's 
previous rulings. 
As Kassop argues, the oral argument transcript shows that the Justices care about the 
substance of arguments, and may sometimes even identify arguments the advocates do not.  
The Attorney General of Pennsylvania, for example, believed that if their state regulations 
could not be upheld under Roe, they could not be upheld at all.  Justice Kennedy suggested 
during argument, however, that a less strict standard of review might still allow the 
regulations to be upheld.  Significantly, in upholding Roe (even while weakening it), the 
Court adopted language from pro-choice interest groups that had served as amici curiae in 
past cases (a sign that arguments can have an impact across time, as well as in the case at 
hand) (Kassop 1993).  
 Additional, and compelling, evidence of the potential for litigants' arguments to 
influence the language of court decisions is found in Corley's (2008) analysis using anti-
plagiarism software.  Corley  used the software Wcopyfind 2.6 to detect similarities in 
language between parties' briefs and majority opinions from the 2002, 2003, and 2004 terms.  
Corley theorizes that adoption of the language used in parties' briefs reflects the influence of 
that party, in that it gives the party whose language is adopted a chance to influence the 
substance of the law.  While the extent to which justices adopted parties' language varied 
among justices, some justices appeared to be influenced significantly.  Justice O'Connor, for 
example, had the highest percentage of language “borrowed” from parties, with 11%, while 
Breyer, Kennedy, Scalia, and Souter, on the low end, borrowed only 7% of the language of 
their opinions from parties' briefs.  These findings have a couple of important implications.  
First, even borrowing as little as 7% of the language from a party's brief could be significant, 
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depending on what language is borrowed.  Additionally, the extent to which various justices 
borrow language from parties could indicate the extent to which litigants can actually hope to 
influence those justices.  This is particularly significant given the relatively low extent of 
borrowing by Justice Kennedy, who is often the court's “swing vote.” 
 
Historical Perspectives on Change 
 As discussed by Pacelle et al. (2011), judicial decision-making ultimately involves a 
complex mix of individual and structural factors.  Attitudes, precedent, issue evolution, and 
the influence of other institutional actors all play a role in judicial decision-making; however, 
the Supreme Court's decisions are also influenced by macro-level, institutional changes.  
Most important for this dissertation is understanding the evolution of the court's role as a 
protector of rights.  In the 20th century, particularly during the Warren Court, the Court's 
agenda shifted away from a focus on economic issues, and toward a greater focus on civil 
rights and liberties (Pacelle, Curry, and Marshall 2011; Pacelle 1991) simultaneously, the 
Court “increasingly became a constitutional tribunal, further exaggerating its influence.” 
(Pacelle, Curry, and Marshall 2011, 202).  The increasing focus on politically salient 
constitutional issues, and the court's increasing power, also saw the potential to increase the 
importance of judicial ideological preferences, as the Court was increasingly dealing with 
issues which lent themselves to ideological differences.  However, the court's decisions even 
in the modern era cannot be explained wholly through attitudinal variables, as justices rarely 
have the luxury of simply voting their policy preferences.  They must also contend with the 
expected reactions of other institutions in a system of separated powers, the need to reach 
agreement with other justices to form a decision, and the need to maintain the court's 
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legitimacy (Pacelle, Curry, and Marshall 2011).   
 As the Warren Court gave way to more conservative courts headed by Burger, 
Rehnquist, and Roberts, the trend of rights expansion did not reverse or end, but rather took 
on a new, conservative direction.  When the court's conservative turn began, a rights-based 
constitutionalism was already fairly well established in American law and politics; the 
conservative courts that followed Chief Justice Warren's tenure have accordingly worked 
within the rights paradigm, and bent it to their own ends, rather than rejecting it (Keck 2004).  
The Rehnquist court, for example, was not hesitant to expand First Amendment freedom of 
expression doctrine to, among other things strike down campaign finance regulations and 
protect commercial speech—in other words, using the idea of freedom of expression to strike 
down policies that were generally in conflict with conservative policy goals, although there 
were notable exceptions to this as well, as with the court's striking down of a statute 
prohibiting burning of the U.S. Flag.  Indeed, the court became ideologically fragmented 
during the Rehnquist era, leading to a minimalist and pragmatic streak that tempered its 
ideological direction. (Gillman and Clayton 1999).    
 The ultimate failure of a more conservative Court to reject rights-based 
constitutionalism points to the “stickiness” of certain modes of institutional decision-making.  
As Keck (2004) notes, “particular constellations of legal ideas tend to become temporarily 
entrenched within constitutional discourse . . . and they shape the preferences of and strategic 
constraints facing subsequent constitutional interpreters.”  (Keck 2004, 12).  The justices are 
not starting, in other words, from a blank slate on which they can impose their preferences.  
The “constellations of legal ideas” Keck refers to can also influence the behavior of litigants, 
in addition to justices.  Keck (2006), for example documents how the court's own decision 
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regarding affirmative action in Regents of the University of California Regents v. Bakke, 438 
U.S. 265 (1978) which struck down racial quotas for medical school admissions but left open 
the possibility of some race-sensitive admissions policies, shaped later attempts to roll back 
affirmative action.  The Bakke decision acted as a catalyst for a right-libertarian campaign, 
spearheaded in this case by libertarian public interest firm the Center for Individual Rights, 
on behalf of “victims” of affirmative action.  Rather than simply serving as an “external 
pressure” on the court, the litigation campaign by CIR was itself shaped by the court's 
previous decisions (Keck 2006).  In understanding the strategies and arguments litigants use 
to advance their causes, it is necessary to be sensitive to the ways in which prior actions by 
the court shape what issues emerge, and what is possible to accomplish through the Court. 
    
Theory:  How Arguments Can Make a Difference 
 There are at least three ways arguments in briefs might make a difference in a 
justice’s decision-making, and accordingly in the language of a decision.  The most obvious 
(but least likely) route is for an argument to actually change a justice’s mind, and for the 
justice to subsequently incorporate that reasoning into his or her decision.  The second is for 
an attorney to make an argument a justice is already inclined to agree with, and for the justice 
to use that reasoning in writing his decision.  This may be done explicitly, by setting out an 
argument and stating the court agrees with its reasoning, or implicitly, but adopting the 
language and reasoning found in a brief without explicitly saying they are so doing.   
 There is also a third, more subtle way that arguments might influence justices, and it 
is best explained through an example.  When Justices decide to take a case, they may already 
have a rough idea of what they believe the outcome should be, and why they should reach 
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said outcome.  In some cases, justices may be open to changing their mind completely about 
the outcome, and in others not at all.  In other cases, they may not be open to changing their 
mind about the eventual outcome, but open to various strands of reasoning which would 
reach that outcome.  It is the job of Supreme Court advocates to determine which justice(s) 
can be persuaded, and which arguments will best appeal to that justice.  In other words, 
advocates must try to identify the “swing justice” (or justices) and use the arguments that will 
swing them the right way.  For example, imagine that there are at least five plausible legal 
arguments for striking down a particular statute, and the attorney representing the party 
hoping to have it struck down believes that Justice Anthony Kennedy is the swing justice in 
this particular case. Based on Kennedy’s prior decisions, the attorney believes Kennedy 
might plausibly accept arguments 1 and 2, but likely not arguments 3 through 5.  
Accordingly, the attorney would emphasize arguments 1 and 2 in his brief, and would 
probably include arguments three through 5, but devote less attention to them.  In this 
scenario, the lawyer’s job might not be viewed as persuading a justice to change his mind, 
but giving him a reason to do what the lawyer wants.  The attorney must identify the “field” 
of potential arguments, which arguments the swing justice might accept, and focus on the 
arguments that the swing justice feels the most comfortable accepting. 
 To take a more concrete example:  Suppose that in 2014, Congress passes a law 
requiring all U.S. Citizens to purchase an annual allotment of broccoli, in order to improve 
public health.  Those who do not purchase their required annual broccoli alignment must pay 
a “broccoli tax” to the U.S. Treasury, the funds from which are then used to pay for public 
health education programs.  The Solicitor General, in defending the law, believes the four 
liberal justices will be willing to uphold the law as a straightforward application of the 
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commerce clause.  Based on the result of NFIB v. Sebelius, however, the SG also believes 
that Alito, Roberts, Thomas, and Kennedy will vote to strike the law down.  He believes that 
Justice Roberts is unlikely to uphold the statute on commerce clause grounds, based on his 
previous decision in Sebelius.  However, based on Sebelius, he believes Roberts might 
uphold the decision based on the taxing power, and accordingly chooses to emphasize this 
argument.  The SG is likely not changing the mind of anyone on the court, nor does he need 
to; he simply needs to give the crucial justice an acceptable reason to do what he wants the 
court to do. 
 Note that each of these methods of influencing justices can take two forms—that of 
arguing that legal doctrine should change, and that of arguing about how existing doctrine 
should apply to new situations. 
 In seeking to understand how advocates try to influence the Justices, I ultimately turn 
to framing theory, a particular way of understanding attempts at persuasion.  This theory is 
described in further detail in the following section. 
 
Issue Framing and Legal Persuasion  
Framing theory is succinctly described by Chong and Druckman (2007b, 104) as 
follows:  “The major premise of framing theory is that an issue can be viewed from a variety 
of perspectives and be construed as having implications for multiple values or considerations. 
Framing refers to the process by which people develop a particular conceptualization of an 
issue or reorient their thinking about an issue.”  The possible application of this theory to 
legal argumentation is readily apparent.  Legal issues may have “implications for multiple 
values or considerations,” and be conceptualized in a variety of different ways. A question of 
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whether to uphold a particular campaign finance statute, for example a limit on spending for 
issue advertisements by political parties, might be conceptualized in terms of at least four 
different values:  1) Freedom of speech on the part of the organization sponsoring the 
advertisement; 2) Congress’s authority to regulate campaigns and elections; 3)  prevention of 
corruption or undue influence (which itself may be characterized in different ways); 4) 
following of any relevant precedent that exists on a particular issue.  It is possible to 
recognize that all of these considerations are important, but a when a judge is trying to decide 
the constitutionality of a statute, it may matter to her which of these frames are more 
important than the other.Issue framing is related to, but distinct from, another concept 
familiar to many political scientists, “agenda setting.” Put simply, the difference is this: 
Agenda setting is the process of determining what issues are talked about; issue framing is 
the process of determining how communicators talk about those issues (Scheufele and 
Tewksbury 2007; Nguyen, et al. 2013). Agenda setting also takes place in the Court, and a 
significant literature has been devoted to that topic (Pacelle 1991; Perry 1994). 
It should also be noted that a frame is distinct from an issue. An issue can be 
understood as an “object of discussion” (Nguyen, et al. 2013) in a text, such as a court 
opinion or legal brief. For example, in the campaign finance cases, campaign contribution 
limits and campaign spending disclosures are two issues that frequently appear. By using 
certain words or phrases, advocates or the Court might highlight certain aspects of each of 
these issues—the freedom of speech concerns related to spending; the privacy and 
assocational freedom concerns associated with disclosures; and concerns about transparency 
and government accountability. Emphasizing one of these aspects of an issue over another 
might change the way the issue is viewed. It should be noted, however, that each of these 
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“frames” mentioned above could also constitute an issue in itself. (Nguyen, et al. 2013). 
Freedom of speech, for example, is an issue that itself receives much discussion in the 
campaign finance cases and many other Supreme Court cases. However, in this study I am 
interested in the use of various frames to discuss specific issues related to campaign finance 
law; the issue definitions come primarily from the various methods of campaign finance 
regulation found in campaign finance statues.  I have defined those issues clearly in the third 
chapter. 
 Much of the academic literature on issue framing involves public opinion (Chong and 
Druckman 2007b) rather than elite decision-making, but the central aspects of the theory are 
applicable in either setting.  First, framing theory assumes that an individual begins with a 
“frame in thought,” a set of attitudes or values toward a topic that an individual associates 
with an issue and weighs according to how important the individual views them in defining 
that issue.  In reality, some individuals have thought little about a subject, so may lack any 
significant pre-existing “frame in thought” on that subject (see, e.g., Zaller’s (1992) 
discussions of public opinion). In the case of the Supreme Court, however, the justices may 
have well-formed pre-existing ideas, especially if they have encountered an issue before as a 
Justice, or in their work prior to ascending to the Court.  Nevertheless, even those with strong 
opinions may be subject to framing effects (Chong and Druckman 2007a, 2007b).  
While a frame in thought represents the pre-existing considerations an individual has 
regarding an issue, a “frame in communication” represents the message a communicator uses 
to attempt to get target listeners or readers to think about an issue in a particular way.  
(Chong and Druckman 2007b; Jacoby 2000). So, one brief in a campaign finance case might 
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focus on the freedom of speech aspects of the case, while another might focus on the 
definition of corruption. 
 Framing can be understood as a process of affecting the weight that an individual 
gives to various considerations.  This can be distinguished from belief change, which adds 
new information to an individual’s considerations, and priming, which makes certain 
considerations temporarily more accessible to an individual.  Priming assumes that an 
individual cannot always “access” all the various concerns about a particular issue at the 
same time, because one may forget or overlook some aspects of an issue at a given time, and 
that the target needs to be “reminded” of that consideration.  While framing and priming are 
closely related, framing focuses on affecting the weight an individual gives to various 
dimensions of an issue, not simply calling that dimension to an individual’s attention.  
(Chong and Druckman 2007a). 
 Another way of understanding how framing works, related to Chong and Druckman’s 
focus on “weight”, is to view framing as involving selection and salience (Entman 1993). 
Entman (1993, p. 53) defines salience as “making a piece of information more noticeable, 
meaningful, or memorable to audiences.” When communicators engage in framing, they are 
selecting some aspects of a subject and increasing their salience in the text with which they 
communicate with the receiver of that communication (Entman 1993). Attorneys, for 
example, are communicators, and engage in framing by choosing some aspects of a case to 
emphasize over others in a brief. An attorney arguing in favor of a campaign finance statute 
might focus on the need to combat political corruption, seeking to make that frame more 
salient in the mind of justices deciding a case. The justices themselves are also 
communicators. When they issue an opinion, they may emphasize one or more particular 
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aspects of the subject being addressed in the opinion. This communicates to attorneys and 
parties who may be involved in future cases what aspects of a case are most salient to the 
Court.  
 An example of framing similarities in the campaign finance cases is exemplified in 
the following two paragraphs. According to the criteria I specified in Chapter 4, the clusters 
of phrases regarding “personal wealth” are found together in some of the documents. These 
phrases reflect the concern of the Court, and some advocates, that political candidates not be 
prevented from using their own personal monetary resources as a source of campaign funds. 
The first paragraph below comes from the petitioner brief in Arizona Free Enterprise Club’s 
Freedom PAC v. Bennett; the second comes from the majority opinion in that case. Phrases 
which my analysis found to be part of the “personal wealth” frame are in bold type: 
In Davis, this Court reaffirmed Buckley's holding that the government may not 
cap a candidate's expenditure of personal funds to finance campaigns. The 
Court specifically noted that a cap on personal expenditures imposes a 
substantial, clear, and direct restraint on the First Amendment right to engage 
in the discussion of public issues and vigorously advocate for one's own 
election. The Court also noted that a restriction on a candidate's use of personal 
funds disserves any anti-corruption purpose because it increases the candidate's 
dependence on outside contributors. (Citations omitted). 
 
(Petitioner Brief, Arizona Free Enterprise Club’s Freedom PAC v. Bennett) 
 
We have repeatedly rejected the argument that the government has a compelling 
state interest in "leveling the playing field" that can justify undue burdens on 
political speech. In Davis, we stated that discriminatory contribution limits 
meant to "level electoral opportunities for candidates of different personal 
wealth" did not serve "a legitimate government objective," let alone a 
compelling one (internal quotation marks omitted). And in Buckley, we held 
that limits on overall campaign expenditures could not be justified by a 
purported government "interest in equalizing the financial resources of 
candidates." After all, equalizing campaign resources "might serve not to 
equalize the opportunities of all candidates, but to handicap a candidate who 
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lacked substantial name recognition or exposure of his views before the start of 
the campaign." (Citations omitted). 
 
(Supreme Court Majority Opinion, Arizona Free Enterprise Club’s Freedom PAC v. 
Bennett) 
There are various concerns present in both of these paragraphs, such as freedom 
of speech, the rejection of an argument about the legitimacy of “leveling the playing 
field” in political campaigns, and the possibility of corruption (or lack thereof).  But 
both paragraphs reflect an emphasis on not treating candidates differently simply 
because they have large amounts of personal funds to spend on a campaign. This type 
of linguistic similarity does not necessarily involve the direct borrowing of language, 
although it can—and that is a common practice among lawyers and judges. It does, 
however, involve the use of certain phrases that emphasize some aspects of an issue 
over others. Here, the fact of a candidate’s personal wealth, and more importantly that 
personal wealth is not a valid criterion for limiting one’s campaign participation, is the 
emphasis. 
 As Wedeking (2010) explains, issue framing is related to Riker’s (1986) concept of 
“heresthetics,” defined as “the art of political manipulation,” or “constructing choice 
situations in order to manipulate outcomes.”  (Epstein and Shvetsova 2002). Adding new 
information or alternatives in a choice situation, agenda setting, and strategic voting are all 
methods one might use in heresthetical maneuvering, which, according to Riker, provides the 
potential to turn political defeat into political victory.  Some evidence exists that Supreme 
Court Justices themselves engage in heresthetics in order to affect the outcome of cases in 
which they believe they may not achieve their favored result.  For example, Epstein and 
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Shvetsova (2002) found evidence that Chief Justice Warren Burger used various strategic 
maneuvers to avoid unfavored outcomes when he believed the court’s status quo did not 
favor his position on a case, such as raising issues of standing, jurisdiction, or justiciability in 
an attempt to have the Court pass on deciding a case and return it to lower courts.  
Additionally, Black, et al. (2013) found evidence that justices engage in heresthetical 
maneuvering during oral argument.  They found that justices who oppose a potential case 
outcome will attempt to raise alternative issues in oral argument, in order to add these issues 
to the case record.  If the justice later believes the Court’s decision on the merits will not go 
the way he prefers, the justice who brought up the alternative issue during oral argument will 
attempt to use that issue to prevent the Court from reaching a decision on the merits.  As with 
Epstein and Shvetsova’s study, this often meant deciding cases on grounds of justiciability, 
standing, or other grounds that involved affirming a case without a decision on the merits or 
sending the case back to a lower court. 
 Wedeking (2010) links heresthetics and framing by evaluating the strategic use of 
frames in communication by litigants who have an incentive to turn the court’s attention 
away from the dominant or prevailing frame, the frame which lower court decisions have 
already established for a case.  Because petitioners before the Court are those who persuaded 
the Court to accept a case, the Court may already be sympathetic toward their framing of the 
issues.  Accordingly, Wedeking believes respondents have a greater incentive to use 
alternative frames in their arguments, in hopes of drawing the Court’s focus to a new frame 
that might result in a more favorable decision.  He finds evidence that respondents do indeed 
engage in such framing, and evidence that it can be effective in influencing the Court’s 
framing of an issue. 
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 Finally, it should be emphasized that I do not claim that issue framing by advocates, 
or legal argument by advocates generally, is the sole source of frames employed by the 
courts. As later parts of the analysis will show, some frames may come from the court itself, 
but others may come from influences outside the legal environment. The Supreme Court is 
not a closed system, and justices may be influenced by outside factors such as public opinion, 
debates in Congress or other indications of elite opinion, their own views, and even in the 
outside world. This analysis does not attempt to answer the ultimate causal question of where 
particular frames originate. Instead, I am analyzing the relationship between the framing in 
advocates’ briefs and the framing in court opinions, as well as changes in framing over time. 
With regard to the relationship between advocacy and court decisions, my goal in this 
chapter is to determine the extent to which the framing of opinions reflects the framing of 
briefs, whether opinions are more similar to briefs or past cases in their use of frames, and 
whether advocates successfully introduce frames into the conversation that were not present 
in lower court decisions. 
 Chapter 4 of this study relies heavily on framing analysis.  That chapter analyzes the 
similarities and differences in the Court’s issue framing across time, and the changes in issue 
frames employed by advocates.  Chapter 4 also utilizes framing analysis to determine 









Chapter Two provides an overview of the evolution of the Supreme Court’s campaign 
finance jurisprudence, and argues that campaign finance law may be usefully divided into 
four eras or periods defined, in part, by the Court’s deference or skepticism toward campaign 
finance legislation.  This chapter also begins to explore differences in the Court’s use of 
language throughout these four periods. 
Chapter Three is a close study of a few occasions in which justices have changed their 
minds on campaign finance issues, on the theory that these are junctures at which legal 
arguments made by litigants might have been particularly effective. 
Chapter Four turns to the study of framing effects for two purposes.  First, it presents 
evidence that issue framing, and not just case outcomes, varies across the four distinct eras of 
campaign finance law.  It then examines whether litigants successfully use issue framing to 
persuade the Court to issue decisions that conflict with the status quo in a given period. 
Finally, I analyze whether advocates succeed in influencing the Court to adopt frames that 
were not present in the lower court decision in a case, thereby highlighting some new 










Chapter 2: Campaign Finance Law Through Time and the Discussion of Arguments 
 
 This chapter has three primary goals.  First, it outlines the development of the 
Supreme Court’s campaign finance cases by dividing them into different periods or eras, and 
examines empirical evidence that the Court treated campaign finance cases differently in 
each era.  Second, it begins the analysis of the language of the Court’s campaign finance 
opinions by examining the explicit discussion of advocates’ briefs in Supreme Court 
campaign finance decisions, and the differences in the Court’s opinion language in different 
periods.  Later chapters will examine the language of briefs themselves, and the extent to 
which the language of briefs and opinions is similar.  I assume that the influence of legal 
arguments is not always expressly acknowledged within court opinions, and language from 
briefs may find its way into court opinions without being expressly acknowledged (Corley 
2008).  However, the Court does explicitly discuss many arguments, and this inquiry begins 
with examining how the court treats them in its opinions. 
 The third and final goal of this chapter is to set forth some theoretical expectations as 
to the role of language in Court opinions and in advocates’ briefs—how briefs might shape 
the Court’s opinions, and how the Court’s opinions will influence briefs in subsequent cases.  
This chapter thus sets the stage for the subsequent chapters, which will examine advocates’ 
use of language in briefs filed with the Court, and the effects of those briefs on the content of 
Court opinions. 
Campaign Finance Law Through Time 
 One of the goals of this project is to understand how legal argument affects the 
change or stability of legal doctrine over time. I would expect the passage of time to matter 
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for a few reasons, which might roughly be divided into the categories “changes in the court” 
and “changes in the external world.”  First, the passage of time means personnel changes on 
the court will eventually occur.  This will change the composition of the court with regard to 
ideological views and legal philosophies.  Furthermore, apart from the personnel changes, 
individual justices may change their position on certain issues over time.  For example, there 
is evidence that some justices experience “ideological drift” over time (Epstein, et al. 2007) 
or change their positions on specific issues (Epstein & Kobylka 1992).  
As for changes in the external world, the passage of time will see the presentation of 
new situations for the Court to deal with, both in the form of new statutes passed by 
Congress, and new challenges to those statutes.  For example, the doctrinal basis of most 
modern campaign finance law is found in the Court’s 1976 decision in Buckley v. Valeo, 
which adjudicated a challenge to the FECA Amendments passed by Congress in 1974.  Since 
then, the Court has recognized that Buckley provided the doctrinal framework for deciding its 
campaign finance cases, even when the justices disagreed on how to interpret Buckley (and 
notwithstanding some dissents which argued that parts of Buckley were altogether wrong). 
However, the Court’s campaign finance doctrine evolved as it was faced with new situations 
to which it must apply Buckley that were not considered in the original decision—for 
example, contributions to ballot measure campaigns, state campaign finance statutes (as 
opposed to the federal ones considered in Buckley), and the extent to which First 
Amendment protections apply to corporations. 
Some of the changes in external world that affect the Court will be driven by outside 
events, while others are driven by the court itself.  Each decision by the Court produces 
actions and reactions by relevant parties and constituencies, such as interest groups or 
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members of Congress.  Accordingly, the political and legal context may change from one 
case to the next.      
 I have chosen to group cases into four time periods, based on doctrinal changes.  
Legal scholar and political scientist Richard L. Hasen has identified distinct trends in the 
Court’s campaign finance doctrine (Hasen 2004, 2008, 2011).  While Hasen does not 
formally identify or name these periods, the time segments into which I divide these cases are 
heavily influenced by his analysis.  This division of the Court’s cases into time periods is also 
influenced by Richards and Kritzer’s (2002) concept of regime theory.  While Kritzer and 
Richards’ original concept of legal regimes has been criticized on methodological grounds 
(Lax and Rader 2010), the basic concept is useful in conceptualizing what differentiates 
distinct periods of legal development in the same area.  According to Richards and Kritzer 
(2002), key precedents form the basis of a legal “regime” that guides the court in deciding 
cases in a particular area.  While justices’ policy preferences still play an important role in 
decision making, regime theory posits that regimes structure the Court’s decisions by 
establishing factors that are relevant in deciding the Court’s cases in a particular legal area.  
After a regime is established, it should influence what legal rules and factual considerations 
are relevant in subsequent cases regarding the same subject.  New regimes may be 
established over time.  Once a new regime is established, the justices will use a different set 
of factors in deciding cases than they did prior to the establishment of the regime.   
 While this analysis does not formally adopt regime theory, it is informed by Richards 
and Kritzer’s idea that there are distinct “breakpoints” after which the factors that go into the 
Court’s decision-making should change.  These breakpoints may involve formal alteration of 
precedent, but they may also involve reinterpretation of precedent that does not formally 
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overturn a prior case.  
 This analysis divides the Court’s campaign finance cases into four periods or eras, 
which are described below.  I selected the cases for analysis in this project by cross-
referencing two sources.  In order to select the appropriate cases, I first performed a key 
number search on Westlaw for Key Number Topics relating to campaign finance law (See 
Appendix 2-1 for list of West Key Number topics).  Once the above topic search was 
conducted, I performed another search in the Supreme Court database (Spaeth) for the 
campaign finance regulation topic, which generated a separate list of cases.  Most of the list 
was the same as the Westlaw list, but it included a few additional decisions.  I then read the 
syllabus of each decision to verify that each one actually involved challenges to federal or 
state campaign finance statutes, either on constitutional or other grounds.  This method 
generated a set of twenty-four campaign finance cases (see Appendix 2-2 for a list of cases). 
I have divided the court’s campaign finance cases into four eras or regimes, and 
coded each opinion accordingly:  1) Pre-Buckley; 2) the Buckley Era; 3) the New Deference 
Era 4) the Deregulation Era (I drew the terms “New Deference” and “Deregulation” to 
characterize these respective periods from Hasen’s (2004, 2011) work.)  Table 2-1 identifies 
each of these eras, the number of cases therein, the time periods they cover, and the 
distinguishing legal characteristics of each.  
In selecting what I believe to be the logical breakpoints, there is, of course, always a 
danger of selection bias.  However, my choice of breakpoints is theoretically informed by 
Hasen’s description of the changes in campaign finance law over time. Furthermore, 
evidence in both this chapter and chapter four supports the claim that these eras can be 
viewed as distinct both with regard to how the Court votes on campaign finance cases and 
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with regard to the language the Court uses in discussing the cases. 




The pre-Buckley Era only contains two cases, and accordingly it is difficult to 
characterize.  However, the first case from this period, U.S. v. UAW-CIO, recognized the 
government’s interest in regulating corporate and union participation in elections.  Although 
much scholarship on campaign finance reform focuses on changes in the law following the 
Federal Elections and Campaign Act of 1971, by the 1950’s corporate influence in elections 
was already a long-standing concern among reformers, and union influence had also become 
a concern among some proponents of reform. At the time of UAW-CIO, federal law 
prohibited campaign contributions from unions and corporations. In this era, a majority of the 
Court had not yet recognized the First Amendment concerns present in campaign finance 
regulations, although Justice Douglas’s dissent in U.S. v. UAW-CIO argued that a statute 
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to legislative judgments 
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was unconstitutional on First Amendment grounds.  The view that the First Amendment 
limited campaign finance legislation would, of course, re-emerge as a majority view two 
decades later in Buckley.  The second case in this period, Cort v. Ash, considered the extent to 
which corporate shareholders could challenge the political activities of a corporation when 
they disagreed with those activities.  While this case was decided unanimously as a matter of 
statutory, rather than constitutional interpretation, the question of shareholder rights is one 
that would arise again in future cases. 
 The Buckley era begins with the recognition by the majority in Buckley v. Valeo that 
some forms of campaign finance legislation burden First Amendment rights. In this era, the 
Court effectively placed the burden on government to demonstrate that campaign finance 
laws were narrowly tailored to prevent corruption or appearance of corruption, and would 
only uphold them if this were so (Hasen 2004). 
 The New Deference Era began in 2000 with Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government 
PAC. In this era, the Court relaxed the scrutiny it applied to campaign finance laws, and 
reduced the burden on government to prove that a law is narrowly tailored to combat 
corruption or its appearance.  In spite of these changes, however, the court never explicitly 
overruled Buckley, providing a sterling example of how significant changes in doctrine can 
result without the Court ever overruling a landmark case.  The culmination of this era was the 
McConnell v. FEC decision, which upheld several provisions of the Bipartisan Campaign 
Finance Reform Act (BCRA, commonly referred to as McCain-Feingold). Hasen (2004, 
2008) argues that in this period, while the Court still used the language of anti-corruption in 
justifying the upholding of campaign finance statutes, it came close to adopting an “equality” 
or “participatory self-government” rationale.  Such a rationale stems from the view that 
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government may legitimately seek to equalize the ability of individuals and groups to 
participate in the political process, by passing laws which minimize the advantage of 
monetary or other resources possessed by some and not by others. 
 The Deregulation Era represents a reversal of the short-lived New Deference Era, and 
a muscular reassertion of skepticism toward campaign finance laws.  While Citizens United v. 
FEC is the most prominent and most salient case in this period, this era really begins with the 
2006 Randall v. Sorrell decision.  In Randall, the Court struck down three provisions of a 
Vermont campaign finance law, most notably deciding, for the first time ever, that a 
campaign contribution limit was unconstitutionally low.  This was also the first campaign 
finance case decided after the departure of Justices Rehnquist and O’Connor from the Court, 
and their replacement by Alito and Roberts. 
In order to determine how various issues related to campaign finance law fared in 
each era, I compiled a dataset of all campaign-finance issues voted on in each of the twenty-
four cases in this study.  I read each case to determine the number of distinct legal issues 
decided in each one. It was necessary to categorize the issues, and while the Supreme Court 
database contains the campaign finance cases, it does not distinguish the various issues that 
are found in each case, such as the differing treatment of spending and contribution limits.1  
Accordingly, I devised my own coding scheme by reading the entire set of cases and 
                                               
1 I also examined the Policy Agendas Project (www.policyagendas.org) to determine if it contained a coding 
scheme relevant to the issues in these cases. However, it contained only codes that might be generally 
relevant to campaign finance (Voting Rights, Participation, and Related Issues; Freedom of Speech) and did not 
have codes for specific issues found within the general area of campaign finance. Similarly, the Policy Frames 
Codebook developed by Boydstun, et al. contains a unified coding scheme that may be used to analyze 
content involving multiple issues. Their scheme contains a set of generalizable content framing codes that 
could be applied to a wide range of issues, while more issue-specific frames can be nested within those more 
general frames. This is a promising approach, but not the most appropriate one for this particular study, as the 
more general frames do not capture the highly issue-specific framing that I expect to appear in this study of a 
single subject area. See Boydstun, et al. (2013) and Boydstun and Gross (2014). 
38 
 
determining the subject matter of each statute, or part of a statute, that the Court dealt with in 
its cases. While this requires relying on my own judgment, the cases are quite clear as to 
what aspects of campaign finance statutes are being considered. Based on the statutory 
provision addressed in the case, I developed seven broad issue-area categories: Contribution 
Limits, Spending Limits, Shareholder Rights, Disclosure and Recordkeeping, Public Finance, 
Solicitation, and Authority of the FEC. I also added an eighth issue category, Jurisdiction, for 
cases that considered the threshold issue of whether the Court had jurisdiction to hear a case. 
This arose in some matters where, for example, there was a question as to whether parties 
were actually harmed by a statute, meaning there was no real case or controversy to hear. 
In the twenty-four cases decided, Court addressed sixty-one separate issues. For each 
issue (n=61), I provided one of the above subject matter codes, and “pro-reform” or “anti-
reform” code based on the Court’s decision on that issue.  Those issue votes coded “pro-
reform” were results that upheld campaign finance laws without significantly weakening 
them, or otherwise ruled in favor of those litigants seeking to defend campaign finance laws.  
Those cases coded “anti-reform” were those that struck down campaign finance laws, 
significantly weakened their scope or application while upholding them, or otherwise found 
in favor of parties seeking to weaken or overturn the laws, or against those seeking to enforce 
them.  Some cases contain multiple issues; Buckley v. Valeo, for example, contains seventeen 
separate issues.  It is possible, and not uncommon, for the decision in a single case to decide 
some issues in a pro-reform direction and others in an anti-reform direction. 
Based on Hasen’s characterization of the cases, and my own reading of the relevant 
cases, I made the following predictions regarding issue votes in each era.  The pre-Buckley 
era only contains two cases, and begins with United States v. UAW-CIO, in which unions 
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challenged campaign and spending contributions.  Because this era was prior to Buckley’s 
enshrinement of First Amendment concerns as a part of campaign finance jurisprudence, I 
predicted this era would be more deferential toward campaign finance legislation, and have 
more “pro” votes.  In turn, I predicted that the Buckley era courts would be more skeptical 
toward campaign finance laws and cast more “anti” votes. 
The next era chronologically, “New Deference” was characterized by doctrine that 
showed greater deference towards legislative judgments, so I expected it to be characterized 
by more “pro” votes.  Finally, I expected the most recent era, “Deregulation” to be 
characterized by a return to skepticism and a greater willingness to strike down or limit the 
application of campaign finance laws (as was seen in Citizens United, for example).  I 
conducted a descriptive analysis of each era by issue outcomes, as shown in Table 2.2.   
Table 2-2:  Issue Votes by Era (Raw Number and Column Percent),  
According to Author’s Dataset 


















































Because of the relatively small amount of data, it is difficult to perform a meaningful 
statistical test on these calculations. However, the descriptive results suggest differences 
between the four eras that merit further investigation. The results were as I expected for the 
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Pre-Buckley era, although as previously noted that era contains only two cases and only three 
separate issue votes.  Contrary to my expectations, the Buckley era proved to be slightly more 
deferential than skeptical, but by a narrow margin; out of thirty-three votes cast in this era, 
eighteen were favorable towards campaign finance laws and fifteen were unfavorable.  On 
the whole, this indicates an era in which the Court was serious about striking down or 
limiting campaign finance laws where they ran afoul of its interpretation of the First 
Amendment, but also willing to uphold them in many circumstances.   
 The New Deference Era shows a marked change from the Buckley era, with eleven of 
thirteen votes being favorable toward campaign finance laws.  So, while the Buckley era was 
somewhat more deferential than I expected, the difference between the two eras (54.55% 
positive votes in Buckley, 78.57% positive votes in New Deference) confirmed my general 
expectation that the New Deference era was marked by a greater judicial restraint.  As further 
expected, this pattern reversed sharply in the deregulation era, with a 10 to 1 margin of 
negative to positive votes on issues.   
In order to check my results against another source, I also performed analysis of issue 
votes in the Court’s campaign finance cases using the Supreme Court Database (Spaeth). As 
with the previous analysis, I grouped the cases by era and direction of vote.  Whereas my 
coding used the “pro-reform” or “anti-reform” designation, the SCDB codes votes as a 
“liberal” or “conservative” direction.  The SCDB generally codes pro-reform votes as 
“liberal” and anti-reform votes as “conservative.” Table 2-3, below, was created using the 
Supreme Court Database’s set of case-centered data, organized by issue/legal provision, 
including split votes.  Accordingly, it displays the number of issues voted on in each period 
of campaign finance law, and how many of those votes were in a liberal or conservative 
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direction.  As with my dataset, the SCDB recognizes multiple issues in each case.  A case 
may contain some issues which are decided in a liberal direction, and others in a conservative 
direction.  However, my coding sometimes differed from the SCDB as to what counts as an 
“issue” and as to the direction of an outcome.  Some issue outcomes that I coded “pro-
reform” (which equates to liberal in the SCDB) were coded conservative in the SCDB, and 
vice versa.  Nevertheless, the SCDB results were substantially similar to my own, except for 
the Pre-Buckley era. 
Table 2-3:  Direction of Votes in Campaign Finance Cases by Era,  
According to Supreme Court Database 
Era Conservative Votes Liberal Votes Total Votes by Era 
Pre-Buckley 
(2 cases) 
2 0 2 
Buckley 
(13 cases) 
16 17 33 
New Deference 
(5 cases) 
5 76 81 
Deregulation 
(5 cases) 
6 2 8 
Total Votes by Direction 29 95 124 
 
 As with my analysis, in the Buckley era, the Court was almost evenly split between 
liberal and conservative decisions, with a slight liberal tilt. Again, the number of issues 
decided in a liberal direction increases dramatically in the New Deference Era.  It should be 
noted, however, that nearly all of the issues decided in a liberal direction in the New 
Deference Era (72 out of 76) were decided in the FEC v. McConnell Case, the central case in 
that era.  While I treated each overall issue outcome in a case as a unit of analysis (for 
example, McConnell v. FEC’s decision on contribution limits), the SCDB apparently treated 
each vote on each petitioner’s claim as a unit of analysis, thereby resulting in a number of 
votes in McConnell v. FEC that overstates the number of issues decided if one considers 
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votes alone.  The case was highly complex, involving many different issues and many 
different plaintiffs who challenged the constitutionality of the new Bipartisan Campaign 
Finance Reform Act.   
 The one major difference between the overall results of my dataset and the SCDB 
was in the treatment of the Pre-Buckley era.  As noted earlier, the small number of cases in 
this era make it difficult to characterize; the SCDB apparently considered the outcome of 
both cases conservative, while I considered the outcome of UAW-CIO to be pro-reform.  
However, at the time that decision was made, the association of campaign finance reform 
with “liberalism” in general was perhaps less strong than it is now, so the SCDB’s coding 
perhaps reflects this. 
Finally, it is important to note that the number of issues decided in one direction or 
another is not a proxy for the importance or influence of a case.  For example, Citizens 
United v. FEC only involved two issues, but the small number of issues involved in the case 
belies the importance of the case in setting the future course of campaign finance 
jurisprudence. 
 
Doctrinal Change and Legal Argument 
 The four eras of campaign finance law described above are important to 
understanding the role of legal argument for two reasons.  First, periods of doctrinal change 
are a time when legal advocacy may have a greater opportunity to make a difference than 
usual.  Obviously, advocates cannot predict doctrinal change ahead of time.  But they are 
aware of circumstances that could lead the Court to depart from previous rulings, such as 
personnel change or cases that present new situations.  Good advocates will take advantage 
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of these changed circumstances, and use them as a chance to present arguments that may not 
have worked in the past (note that these may be altogether new arguments, or 
repeating/refining arguments that have been made unsuccessfully in the past).  Accordingly, 
in order to see where arguments can make a difference in the doctrine announced by the 
Court, we should pay special attention to the first case that signals the beginning of doctrinal 
change. 
 Second, once the Court begins to change its doctrine, it will affect the arguments 
made by attorneys.  Once the Court changes doctrine, attorneys realize they now have the 
chance to successfully make arguments that would not have previously been accepted.  
Additionally, attorneys representing clients on the losing side of doctrinal change realize they 
are now going to have to alter their argumentative strategies.  Accordingly, we should expect 
arguments to change in two ways after doctrinal change begins.  Those advocates who are on 
the “winning side” of the change will take advantage of the change to further press their 
advantage and gain additional victories, and argue accordingly.  Those on the losing side will 
abandon or de-emphasize previously successful arguments when the Court signals it will no 
longer accept them, and focus on other arguments the advocates believe to be consistent with 
the Court’s new doctrine, but still consistent with the advocates’ goals.   
 Subsequent chapters will analyze whether legal argument appears to play a role in 
doctrinal “breakpoints”.  The next section of this chapter presents an overview of the Court’s 
treatment of legal arguments for and against campaign finance laws. 
 
How the Court Treats Legal Argument 
 Having examined historical trends in the way the Court votes on campaign finance 
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issues, the analysis now turns to an overview of the Court’s treatment of arguments for and 
against various federal and state campaign finance statutes.  This section examines the 
Court’s explicit treatment of arguments made by advocates in their briefs.   
 The data in this section are each of the twenty-four campaign finance decisions, with 
any separate opinions treated as a separate document.  Each opinion is coded by type:  
majority, plurality, concurring, or dissenting.  In the case of opinions that concur in part and 
dissent in part, I have separated them into the concurring and dissenting portions and treated 
each portion as separate documents.    Finally, whenever an opinion has different sections 
that are joined by different coalitions of justices, I have treated each section as a separate 
document.  This is because different coalitions of justices will agree to different content.  For 
example, an opinion written by Justice Roberts might see Justices Alito, Scalia, Kennedy, and 
Thomas joining one part, and Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor and Kagan joining 
another part.  It is likely that the two parts of this opinion would reach very different 
outcomes, whether viewed in terms of liberal versus conservative direction, or pro- or anti-
reform direction.  The difference in outcome and content in these opinions is likely a 
reflection of the differing judicial ideologies, legal philosophies, and policy preferences of 
the justices in each coalition. 
 Within each separate opinion, I have assigned certain codes to any mention of a brief 
filed by a party or amicus.  The portion of an opinion that discusses the brief, which I will 
call the “brief-discussion” is the unit of analysis in this portion of the chapter.  This includes 
detailed and substantive discussion of a legal argument from a brief, as well as short 
mentions of an argument or fact cited in a brief.  In some cases, the “brief-discussion” is a 
single sentence; in others it may go on for several paragraphs.  Using QDA Miner Qualitative 
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Data Analysis Software, I have coded each such segment in the opinions with certain criteria.  
Any segment of an opinion that does not mention a party or amicus brief is not coded. 
 In order to determine when a “brief-discussion” begins and ends, I relied on the 
Court’s own explicit discussion of arguments from briefs. Each brief-discussion begins at the 
beginning of the paragraph that explicitly mentions a particular argument from a brief, and 
ends with the last paragraph explicitly discussing that subject. In many cases, explicit 
discussions of a brief last for only a single paragraph. The following is an example of a brief 
discussion from Buckley v. Valeo in which the Court disagrees with a party’s argument: 
 Appellants contend that the contribution limitations must 
be invalidated because bribery laws and narrowly drawn 
disclosure requirements constitute a less restrictive means of 
dealing with “proven and suspected quid pro quo arrangements.” 
But laws making criminal the giving and taking of bribes deal 
with only the most blatant and specific attempts of those with 
money to influence governmental action. And while disclosure 
requirements serve the many salutary purposes discussed 
elsewhere in this opinion, Congress was surely entitled to 
conclude that disclosure was only a partial measure, and that 
contribution ceilings were a necessary legislative concomitant to 
deal with the reality or appearance of corruption inherent in a 
system permitting unlimited financial contributions, even when 
the identities of the contributors and the amounts of their 
contributions are fully disclosed. 
 
(Buckley v. Valeo, 28-29). 
  
 First, each brief-discussion is coded with the Court’s stance on that portion of the 
brief.  The codes (referred to hereinafter as “treatment codes”) are as follows (with most 
segments fitting into the first two categories):2 
                                               
2 With regard to coding, intercoder reliability checks will be necessary before preparing all or parts of this 






 None (court mentions an argument or piece of information from a brief, but takes no 
position on it) 
 
 Unnecessary to Evaluate (court finds it unnecessary to evaluate the argument or 
information, usually because it is moot) 
 
 Support (court cites a brief in support of an argument it is already making; these 
instances overwhelmingly involve citations of facts from briefs) 
 
 Lack of Ripeness/Relevance (the issue raised by the brief is either irrelevant or not 
ripe, and therefore should not be decided by the Court) 
 
 An initial question that must be dealt with is the extent to which the Court discusses 
arguments it agrees with versus those it disagrees with.  This will be important when 
conducting textual analysis, as the mere presence of words or phrases in an opinion may be 
misleading without the context with reveals the position it is taking on an argument.  
Additionally, there is a solid reason to think justices might devote a good deal of attention to 
arguments they disagree with.  There is already evidence that, during oral argument, justices 
ask more questions of the party they eventually rule against (Johnson, et al. 2009).  This may 
be in part because they are trying to persuade their colleagues, rather than trying to elicit 
more information from the parties. Even at the stage of writing opinions, however, the Court 
may have good reasons to address arguments it disagrees with in detail.  While they can no 
longer persuade their colleagues about the outcome of that case, they might persuade their 
colleagues to change their mind in future cases, or persuade future Court  members to reach a 
different result. Accordingly, it is important to understand whether the Court’s opinions 
devote significant attention to arguments it disagrees with, since its discussion of specific 
arguments from briefs might consist partially of demonstrating why certain arguments are 
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wrong.   
 There are other good reasons to expect the Court to extensively discuss arguments it 
disagrees with. First, judges know that the lawyers who argued the cases, as well as other 
interested attorneys, legal scholars, and journalists, will be reading the opinions they write.  
Accordingly, they need to explain the reasons for their decisions in a way that is credible and 
defensible to their audiences (Baum 2006).   In order to do so, they need to show why the 
arguments they ultimately rejected were not persuasive.  Additionally, explaining which 
arguments the Court rejects could help bolster the precedential strength of an opinion, 
another possible goal of justices (Hansford and Spriggs 2006), in that it closes off future lines 
of argument, or at least makes those lines less likely to be raised again (at least until a change 
in court personnel or a change in circumstances). This also serves the purposes of both lower 
courts and advocates.  For lower courts, it helps in applying the decision to subsequent cases, 
in that they know which arguments have already been rejected on a certain topic.  With 
regard to advocates, it helps guide their future arguments, in that they know which arguments 
are likely to be rejected, and they can now modify future arguments (both in lower courts and 
the Supreme Court) accordingly.   
Accordingly, the Court’s negative versus positive treatment of arguments it discusses 
warrants analysis. I expected that the Court, in its majority and plurality opinions, would 
discuss arguments it disagrees with more than those it agrees with. The extent to which 
arguments were discussed in a negative or positive manner was measured in two different 
ways.  First, QDA Miner calculates the number of words in a document associated with each 
treatment code. I predict that in the majority and plurality opinions, a greater number of 
words in the opinion will be contained in a negative brief-discussion than in a positive brief-
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discussion.  In other words, the Court will devote more words to discussing arguments it 
disagrees with than those it agrees with. 
The second measure of treatment is a count of the number of brief-discussions  
concerning arguments the court agrees with, and the number of brief discussions concerning 
arguments it disagrees with.  Consistent with my prediction regarding the word count 
measure, I predict that the majority and plurality opinions will disagree with a greater 
number of brief-discussions than they agree with.  
As for examples of agreement and disagreement, the following paragraph from 
Buckley v. Valeo concerning a petitioner argument exemplifies the Court’s discussion of an 
argument it disagrees with: 
Appellants contend that the contribution limitations 
must be invalidated because bribery laws and narrowly drawn 
disclosure requirements constitute a less restrictive means of 
dealing with “proven and suspected quid pro quo 
arrangements.” But laws making criminal the giving and taking 
of bribes deal with only the most blatant and specific attempts 
of those with money to influence governmental action. And 
while disclosure requirements serve the many salutary 
purposes discussed elsewhere in this opinion, Congress was 
surely entitled to conclude that disclosure was only a partial 
measure, and that contribution ceilings were a necessary 
legislative concomitant to deal with the reality or appearance of 
corruption inherent in a system permitting unlimited financial 
contributions, even when the identities of the contributors and 
the amounts of their contributions are fully disclosed. 
 
(Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 27-28). 
An example of positive treatment, on the other hand, is found in the following 
paragraph from Buckley: 
The constitutional deficiencies described in Thomas v. 
Collins can be avoided only by reading § 608(e)(1) as limited 
to communications that include explicit words of advocacy of 
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election or defeat of a candidate, much as the definition of 
“clearly identified” in § 608(e)(2) requires that an explicit and 
unambiguous reference to the candidate appear as part of the 
communication. This is the reading of the provision suggested 
by the non-governmental appellees in arguing that “(f)unds 
spent to propagate one's views on issues without expressly 
calling for a candidate's election or defeat are thus not 
covered.” We agree that in order to preserve the provision 
against invalidation on vagueness grounds, § 608(e)(1) must be 
construed to apply only to expenditures for communications 
that in express terms advocate the election or defeat of a clearly 
identified candidate for federal office. 
 
(Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 43-44). 
Table 2-4 shows the result of the measurements of the percentage of words in each 
decision (including footnotes) devoted to each type of argument. 
Table 2-4 
Number of Words in Opinions Discussing Arguments, by Opinion Type 






































































The “TOTAL” row in the above table provides the total percentage of words in each 
type of opinion dedicated to discussing arguments from briefs. Plurality and majority 
opinions, at 28.6% and 48.2%, respectively, devoted the greatest percentage of words to 
explicitly discussing arguments. 
 The above results support my expectation that the Court will dedicate a greater 
portion of its opinion discussing arguments it disagrees with than those it agrees with, 
although the lack of words in some cells prevented me from using a chi-square to test 
statistical significance. In majority opinions, 23.5% of words were spent discussing 
arguments the Court rejected, as opposed to only 4% spent discussing those arguments the 
Court agreed with.  The difference is not as pronounced in plurality opinions, but still 
present; plurality opinions spent 24.1% of their words discussing arguments they disagreed 
with, as opposed to 18.9% discussing arguments they agreed with.   
It is not clear if there is a particular reason that plurality opinions spent a greater 
percentage of words discussing arguments from briefs they agreed with than the majority 
opinions did.  Of the twenty four full cases in the dataset, only five of them had plurality, as 
opposed to majority, opinions, so this may simply be an artifact of one or two plurality 
opinions that devoted a particularly large number of words to discussing arguments it agreed 
with. (Because of the way I have divided opinions here, the five plurality opinions are 
divided into six separate documents, since one case had a plurality opinion with two parts in 
which each part was joined by a different coalition of justices). It may be that the authors of 
those particular plurality opinions found certain arguments especially important or 
persuasive, and accordingly thought it worthwhile to discuss them in depth.  It is also 
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possible that, because a plurality opinion has less precedential force than a majority opinion, 
the plurality authors feel a greater need to address the parties’ arguments in detail.  
A simple code count (of the “Agree” and “Disagree” codes only), as shown in Table 
2-5, also reveals a greater emphasis on arguments the Court disagrees with than those it 
agrees with.  The opinions contain 218 separate discussions coded “disagree”, and 30 coded 
“agree.”  Additionally, the “disagree” code is present in 41.2% of opinions (of all types), and 
agree only in 19.3%.  A more detailed analysis of the code counts, seen in Table 2-6, provides 
a closer look at the types of arguments discussed by various opinions. 
 
Table 2-5: Code Counts for "Agree" and "Disagree" 
Code Count % Codes Cases % Cases 
Agree 30 3.1% 22 19.3% 
Disagree 218 22.4% 47 41.2% 
 
Table 2-6 
Code Counts-argument treatment by opinion type 
Court’s Position 
on Argument 
Majority Plurality Concurring Dissenting 
Agree 20 2 1 6 
Disagree 179 18 7 13 
No Position 12 1 2 0 
Lack of 
Ripeness/Relevance 
2 0 1 0 
Unnecessary to 
Evaluate 
3 1 1 0 
Support 1 0 0 16 
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Table 2-6 shows the prevalence of different categories of argument treatment by 
opinion type.  The counts represent coding occurrences at the argument-discussion level.  So, 
for example, majority opinions in this dataset discuss 21 separate arguments with which they 
agree, and 180 separate arguments with which they disagree. Concurring and dissenting 
opinions also discussed more arguments with which they disagreed.  
  Finally, the extent to which the Court discusses arguments it rejects also sheds 
some light on past work concerning the language of Supreme Court opinions, and how that 
research may be expanded.  Corley (2008) used plagiarism detection software to detect the 
extent to which court opinions “borrowed” from briefs, and found that a good deal of such 
borrowing occurred.  However, the results from this investigation show that, at least in this 
dataset, a significant portion of the opinion is dedicated to discussing arguments that are 
rejected.  Accordingly, much of the “borrowing” of language could come from discussing 
arguments that are rejected, rather than representing influence of briefs on the language of the 
opinions.   
 Another interesting result to emerge from the table is the distribution of argument 
discussions in the “support” category.  These were discussions in which the opinion did not 
so much analyze an argument, as cite something from a brief to support a point the opinion is 
making.  In some cases a legal argument is cited, but these codes more often refer to 
instances when the Court has cited facts from a brief to support its own point.  The results 
show the use of briefs for support is greater in dissenting opinions than in other types, 
although the correlation here is not statistically significant.  While the prevalence of brief 
citations for “support” in dissenting opinions could be random, there is a good reason for it to 
occur; the authors of dissenting opinions may believe that the majority ignored certain key 
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facts in its opinion, and thus feels it necessary to bring these to attention in criticizing the 
majority.   
 
Amicus Arguments v. Party Arguments 
Another important aspect of opinions’ treatment of legal argument is the extent to 
which they discuss party v. amicus arguments.  I would expect less discussion of amicus 
arguments than party arguments in majority and plurality opinions, because the Court may 
feel obligated to respond to party arguments to some extent, but likely feels little such 
obligation toward amici, whose views they are free to ignore if they wish.3  Accordingly, I 
expect that in majority and plurality opinions, a greater number of argument-discussions will 
be devoted to discussing party arguments than amicus arguments (and a greater number of 
party arguments than amicus arguments will be discussed).   
 
Table 2-7 
Discussion of Party v. Amicus Arguments
Party Majority Plurality Concurring Dissenting 
Appellant 127 14 5 19 
Appellee 79 7 8 5 
Amicus for 
Appellant 
6 1 0 3 
Amicus for 
Appellee 
7 1 0 7 
Amicus 
Unclear 
2 0 0 1 
Unclear 2 0 0 0 
Intervenor 0 3 1 2 
 
                                               
3 With the possible exception of the Solicitor General’s Office, whose views as amicus are often seriously 
considered.  Having the SG present as an amicus in a case also increases the chances that the side the SG 





 My expectation concerning amicus v. party arguments is supported by the descriptive 
statistics shown in Table 2-7. This table shows the number of times arguments for parties 
(divided into appellant and appellee) and arguments by amici are discussed in the various 
types of opinions.   
 
Ideology, Judicial Values, and Changing Minds 
It is impossible to address a topic as ideologically-charged as campaign finance 
without addressing the role that Justices’ policy preferences play in their decision-making.  
Indeed, part of this project’s goal is to identify the interaction of judicial values with legal 
arguments.  Liberal judicial ideology is generally associated with rulings favorable toward 
campaign finance reform legislation, and the opposite is true for conservative judicial 
ideology.  The Supreme Court Database, for example, codes decisions upholding campaign 
finance laws as “liberal,” and those limiting them or striking them down as “conservative.”  
And, as the example of Randall v. Sorrell demonstrates, a personnel change that shifts the 
Court’s ideological center can affect the direction of its campaign finance jurisprudence.  The 
issues surrounding campaign finance are quite complex, however, and do not easily track 
onto contemporary “liberal” or “conservative” ideologies in all instances; additionally, some 
campaign finance cases, as with other complex constitutional cases, present conflicting 
priorities within the same set of ideological beliefs.  Still others present matters that may be 
decided on grounds of statutory interpretation that do not involve constitutional principles, 
and are thus less ideologically divisive. 
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 An example of the latter category is Justice Brennan’s opinion (for a unanimous 
court) in Cort v. Ash, which ruled that shareholders did not have a private right of action 
under FECA against corporations for making political contributions against the shareholders’ 
wishes.  This might be described as a “conservative” result, and indeed is coded so in the 
Supreme Court Database, because it closes off a particular avenue of enforcing campaign 
finance laws.  As mentioned above, however, this case was decided as a matter of fairly 
straightforward statutory interpretation, in a manner that commanded the Court’s unanimous 
agreement.  This “conservative” decision might seem out of character for a Justice who is 
often regarded as a solid Warren Court liberal, but is actually quite understandable when one 
considers the grounds for the decision.  By the same token, the typically conservative Justice 
Rehnquist was often more deferential toward campaign finance laws than his ideological 
orientation might suggest, especially with regard to state laws.  This stems from two aspects 
of Rehnquist’s legal philosophy.  First, he was a strong defender of states’ rights, and was 
willing to defend the prerogative of states to regulate their own political process.  Second, 
with regard to regulation of corporate spending, he recognized that corporations were the 
creations of state law, and believed that states accordingly had a large degree of leeway in 
regulating corporate political activity. These views could legitimately be interpreted as 
matters of judicial philosophy, or as matters of conflicting policy goals (i.e., a conservative 
view of states’ rights conflicts with and ultimately overcomes conservative skepticism of 
regulating the political process).  At any rate, Rehnquist’s and Brennan’s views illustrate the 
limitations of simply describing campaign finance decisions as “liberal” or “conservative.” 
 It is also possible that the association of particular views on campaign finance laws 
with liberal or conservative ideology has hardened as the Court has become more polarized 
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(Graber 2013).  As Graber notes, the Supreme Court has become more ideologically 
polarized, in a manner reflecting polarization among American political elites more 
generally, and also reflecting the phenomenon of “conflict extension.” As the Court becomes 
more ideologically polarized, advocates also face a potentially troublesome situation.  With 
the Court’s views “hardened” along ideological lines, opportunities for persuasion become 
fewer and further between.  Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, for example, changed her position 
on the constitutionality of spending limits three times over her career (Hasen 2011), and one 
can find other examples of “inconsistent” votes on the part of Justices.  While these changes 
may represent indecisiveness on the part of a frequent swing justice such as O’Connor, they 
may also represent a willingness of justices to consider alternative points of view and to 
change their minds when presented with a persuasive argument.  The polarization of the 
Court, then, may mean that the job of Supreme Court attorneys becomes significantly more 
difficult, as the Justices’ minds may already be made up, to even a greater extent than before. 
 
The Language of Campaign Finance Law: Variation Through Time 
 Finally, this chapter begins to examine the language of court opinions, and its 
variation over time.  The current analysis focuses on features of the majority and plurality 
opinions in the campaign finance case dataset, and how the language varies in the four 
different periods identified earlier. 
 In order to conduct this analysis, the set of opinions was filtered to include only 
majority and plurality opinions.  Using Wordstat 6.0 content analysis software, a list of 
phrases between two and five words found in these opinions was generated.  The software 
searches for phrases that recur in the documents, and can be directed to search for phrases of 
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a particular length and for phrases that appear a minimum number of times or in a minimum 
number of cases.  In this case, I directed the software to detect phrases of at least two words, 
and no more than five words, which appear at least ten times in the relevant documents.  (No 
minimum number of documents was set, so a phrase would be detected if, for example, it 
appears ten times in a single document, or appears a few times in several documents for a 
total of ten times).   
 The analysis detects the frequency of each phrase, and the number and percentage of 
cases in which it appears.  In addition to calculating the frequency of phrases, the program 
uses tf.idf weighting to provide more insight as to the importance of the phrases in the 
documents.  The tf.idf method assigns a weight to each phrase equal to the product of its term 
frequency and inverse document frequency, thereby providing a measure of a phrase’s 
importance to a document or set of documents (Evans, et al. 2007).  The term frequency is 
simply a measure of the number of times a term occurs in a corpus of documents.  The 
inverse document frequency is a measure of the extent to which a term commonly occurs in 
the corpus of documents. By using inverse document frequency, very common words such as 
“the” are given less weight than they otherwise would be if a pure measure of term frequency 
were used.  
In order to narrow down the phrases generated by the analysis, I filtered the results to 
include only words and phrases relating to the First Amendment, in one set (“Speech”, 
“Association,” “First Amendment”), and those relating to corruption in another set 
(“Corruption,” “Quid Pro Quo”).  The protection of First Amendment Freedoms, and the role 
of campaign finance laws in combating corruption, are two of the most commonly discussed 
topics in the campaign finance cases.  The extent to which the usage of phrases related to 
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these topics varies in different periods provides some insight into the changes in the court’s 
views on these issues.  
 Table 2-8 shows the results for phrases involving the First Amendment.  Here, 
“political speech” is by far the most frequently appearing phrase.  It appears in the 
“Deregulation” era more than any other.  This reflects the extent to which the deregulation 
era has seen a re-emphasis on the importance of protecting what the court views as the 
fundamental First Amendment freedom of speech in the political arena.  Other phrases 
characteristic of the Deregulation era also reflect this emphasis, such as “Violate the First 
Amendment,” “Campaign Speech”, and “Protect Speech.” 
 The New Deference era is characterized only by a greater number of occurrences of 
“Associational Burden,” and “Speech and Association,” both of which are too vague to draw 
any real conclusions from.  Otherwise, none of the phrases involving speech seem to be 
particularly associated with the New Deference era, which reflects that period’s shift of 
emphasis away from protecting speech and towards prevention of corruption.  This difference 
is also borne out in Table 2-9.  “Appearance of Corruption,” “Threat of Corruption,” and 
“Apparent Corruption” are particularly characteristic of the New Deference Era, 
demonstrating this era’s broad view of what constitutes “corruption” in politics that is 
properly regulable by the state.  The phrases “quid pro quo”, on the other hand, is 
characteristic of the Deregulation Era, indicating the Roberts’ Court’s view that this is the 
only type of corruption the government should be regulating.  The table of corruption-related 
phrases also reveals that various phrases related to corruption tend to be more characteristic 
of the New Deference period or the Deregulation period, although these phrases also 
appeared in Buckley-Era cases.  This could indicate that more wrangling over the meaning of 
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the word “corruption” has occurred during the New Deference and Deregulation eras, 
whereas the meaning of the term was more settled in the Buckley era. 
 
Table 2-8:  Phrases Related to First Amendment 









Political Speech 120 16 44.40% 42.3 0 22 7 91 
Violate the First 
Amendment 
38 17 47.20% 12.4 0 17 5 16 
Campaign Speech 31 6 16.70% 24.1 0 3 1 27 
Political Association 26 10 27.80% 14.5 0 13 10 3 
Free speech 23 11 30.60% 11.8 1 12 2 8 
Protect speech 23 8 22.20% 15 0 9 2 12 
Freedom of speech 22 10 27.80% 12.2 1 15 1 5 
Unincorporated 
association 
16 7 19.40% 11.4 0 15 0 1 
Corporate speech 16 5 13.90% 13.7 0 8 3 5 
Speech and 
association 
13 7 19.40% 9.2 0 5 8 0 
Freedom of 
association 
12 5 13.90% 10.3 0 12 0 0 
Engage in political 
speech 
11 7 19.40% 7.8 0 5 0 6 
Fundamental First 
Amendment 
10 7 19.40% 7.1 0 7 0 3 
Associational 
freedom 
10 6 16.70% 7.8 0 8 2 0 
Speech of privately 
financed candidate 
10 1 2.8% 15.6 0 0 0 10 








Table 2-9:  Phrases Related to Corruption 











64 14 38.90% 26.3 0 19 29 16 
Quid Pro Quo 49 12 33.3% 23.4 0 13 17 19 
Corruption and the 
Appearance 
22 10 27.80% 12.2 0 5 9 8 
Corruption or the 
Appearance 
22 10 27.80% 10.6 0 6 6 7 
Apparent Corruption 19 9 25.00% 11.4 0 7 10 2 
Corrupt Practices 
Act 
18 9 25.00% 10.8 7 6 5 0 
Interest in Preventing 
Corruption 
13 10 27.80% 7.2 0 4 3 6 
Anticorruption 
Interest 
12 4 11.10% 11.5 0 0 2 10 





 The above results demonstrate that changes in the Court’s jurisprudence are reflected 
in language usage, and not merely in votes.  Even the frequency with which certain words 
and phrases appear, and their likelihood of appearing, can represent a shift in emphasis in the 
Court’s doctrine.  In addition, we know that when the Court is discussing arguments from 
briefs, it tends to give more attention to arguments it rejects.  We also know that the Court 
spends far more time explicitly addressing party arguments than amicus arguments.  These 
insights lead us to the questions posed in the subsequent chapters regarding the influence of 
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briefs on the Court’s language, advocates’ attempts to alter their language to persuade the 
Court, and how legal argumentation affects a process of decision making in which the key 
decision-makers, the Justices, often have already formed strong opinions on the matters 
brought before them. 
 Chapter 4 will provide a closer examination of the variance in the Court’s use of 
language in different eras, and analyze evidence that the language in briefs influences 
opinion language.  First, however, the next chapter will take a close look at instances in 
which justices have changed their minds on certain campaign finance issues.  This provides 


















Chapter 3:  Argument as an Explanation for Change and Variation? 
 
 The goal of this chapter is to determine whether evidence exists that legal argument 
can persuade justices to do something unexpected—changing their mind on an issue they 
have previously ruled on, or voting against their typical ideological tendency.  This chapter is 
meant to address one obvious criticism of the view that legal arguments affect the court’s 
doctrinal pronouncements—the claim that justices’ doctrinal pronouncements are merely 
post-hoc justifications for decisions based on policy preferences.  However, if we observe a 
justice changing her mind on an issue, or voting contrary to her ideology, there is a potential 
that legal argument was a factor in her decision.  The first step in this process is to identify 
such unexpected votes on the part of justices. The second step is to determine whether there 
is evidence in the decision—either explicit or implicit—that a particular argument was 
influential in the justice’s decision.   
 If we see justices voting in ways different from what their ideology or past vote 
history would lead us to expect, arguments could be making a difference. Direct evidence of 
this is exceedingly hard to come by, and would normally only be found in documents such as 
internal memos circulated among the justices that detail the process of reaching decisions. 
Even then, justices’ actual thought processes might not be evident in these memos. However, 
one other place to look for such evidence is opinions themselves, which may adopt language 
from briefs written by parties or amici. While this is not direct evidence that a particular 
argument made the difference, it does suggest that the justice found the language of that 
argument to be a useful means of expressing his or her thoughts on the issue.  This would 
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then tell us, at the least, whether we should look for further evidence of that argument’s 
influence on the justice. 
 I begin by analyzing the votes of each justice in each of the twenty four campaign 
finance cases decided in the modern era.  Each justice’s series of votes will be analyzed to 
determine whether that justice has changed his or her mind on an issue at any point, and also 
to determine how often that justice has voted against ideological type. I then examine the 
cases in which a justice has changed his mind to determine if there has been any detectable 
influence from briefs.  First, I will examine the part of the opinion that explains the decision 
to determine whether the opinion explicitly adopts or agrees with an argument from a party 
or amicus brief.  Then I will look for “uncredited” influence by searching the briefs filed in 
each case for linguistic similarities to the relevant portion of the opinion. 
 
Data 
 As with the other chapters, the twenty-four cases analyzed in this section are drawn 
from a search of the Campaign Finance cases in the Supreme Court Database, cross-
referenced against a Westlaw search.  In order to conduct the analysis herein, I then 
constructed a dataset which codes the votes made by justices in these cases.  For my own 
purposes, I coded the data differently than the Supreme Court Database.  I am interested in 
whether justices change their minds on particular policy issues based on legal arguments, so 
the dataset is organized according to votes on policy issues.  I compiled a list of policy issues 
by reading the decisions.  Each observation represents a single justice’s vote on a particular 
policy issue in a case, and cases may have multiple policy issues. (A full codebook is 
provided in Appendix 3-1, and includes coding for some variables that were not used in this 
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analysis).   
 Each observation (n=530) is coded for the following categories:  
1) Justice 
    Justice’s last name 
 
2) Style of Case 
An abbreviated version of the style (title) of the case; for example, Citizens United v.  FEC. 
 
3)  Era (as defined in Chapter 2) 
     Pre-Buckley, Buckley, New Deference, or Deregulation 
 
4) Vote Direction:  Liberal or Conservative 
 Each observation is coded as liberal, conservative, or neither.  Like the Supreme 
Court database, I assumed that a vote that upholds or strengthens campaign finance laws is a 
“liberal” vote, and those that overturn or weaken them are “conservative.”  This is based on 
current political understandings that strengthening campaign finance laws is generally a goal 
pursued by liberals, and weakening them is generally a goal pursued by conservatives, but 
there are obvious and well-known exceptions (such as Sen. McCain’s support for campaign 
finance reform).  These characterizations do not necessarily assume that either goal is 
inherently liberal or conservative, but are merely drawn from conventional political 
understandings.  Because I did not always agree with the SCDB’s interpretation of which 
votes were liberal or conservative, I coded each vote myself in this regard.  For example, the 
SCDB might code a vote as liberal if it upholds a campaign finance statute against a 
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challenge to its constitutionality, even though the result of the case weakens the statute by 
limiting its applicability.  In this case, I would code the decision as conservative because of 
its overall effect on the status quo is to move policy in a conservative direction. 
 Because I used my own coding scheme rather than a pre-existing one, the possibility 
of confirmation bias and the question of replicability are obvious concerns. As for 
confirmation bias, I devised the coding scheme before I formed expectations about individual 
votes. Additionally, my criteria for coding an individual justice’s votes as “liberal” or 
“conservative” are the same as my criteria for coding case outcomes as “pro-reform” or 
“anti-reform” in Chapter 2; the pro-reform criteria are the same as the criteria for a liberal 
vote, and the anti-reform criteria are the same as the criteria for a conservative vote. Here, I 
simply employed the terms “liberal” and “conservative” to reflect the terminology other 
scholars have used in discussing the direction of justices’ votes. (See, e.g. Segal et al. 1993 
and 2002). As discussed previously in Chapter 2, my own coding of overall case outcomes 
was substantially similar to the SCDB’s coding, reflecting a significant degree of consistency 
with an independent source. I expect the same to be true of my coding of individual justice’s 
votes, since they are based on the same criteria. Any future revision of this document for 
publication would include additional checks of all individual justices’ votes in my analysis 
against the SCDB coding, however, and would include intercoder reliability checks based on 
my coding rules as well.  
5)  Issue area:  Each vote was coded for the policy issue area it concerns.  I compiled the 
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 The next step in this analysis is to determine whether justices have cast inconsistent 
votes.  For purposes of this analysis, an “inconsistent” vote is one that is cast in the opposite 
ideological direction from other votes by that justice in the same issue area.  For example, if 
a justice cast a total of ten votes on the “spending” issue, three of which were conservative 
and seven of which were liberal, we would observe an inconsistency in their voting on this 
issue.  If their voting history on an issue does not always fall along ideological lines, there is 
a possibility that legal argument has made a difference in their decision.  
 In this examination of the data, three issue areas have been dropped because they are 
unlikely to illuminate much about justices’ voting histories.  Issues involving jurisdiction, 
standing, mootness, etc.—which I have grouped under the general category “jurisdiction”—
have been dropped because these issues are highly fact-specific, and often not comparable 
with one another in any meaningful way.  Additionally, observations concerning the authority 
of the FEC have been dropped.  The vast majority of these observations occurred in Buckley 
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v. Valeo, in which the Court concluded that the FEC, as constituted, was unconstitutional 
because it gave powers normally reserved to the executive to the legislative branch.  The only 
other case involving issues of the FEC’s authority concerns a question of statutory 
construction, not constitutional interpretation, and is hardly comparable to the questions dealt 
with in Buckley.  Finally, the “shareholder rights” issue has been dropped from the dataset, 
because the Court only directly address it in one case, Cort v. Ash.4  In that case, the Court 
unanimously held that FECA did not create a private right of action in corporate shareholders 
against officers and directors as a means of enforcing FECA. 
 Once these observations are removed from the dataset, 407 observations remain.  Five 
issue categories, which might be viewed as the core policy issues in campaign finance cases, 
remain:  Campaign Contributions, Campaign Spending, Disclosures and Recordkeeping, 
Public Financing, and Solicitation.  Table 3-1 provides an overview of the number of votes 
cast on each issue in each era. 






Issue Area      
Contribution Limits 8 44 27 9 88 
Spending Limits 8 102 36 36 182 
Disclosure/Record-
keeping 
0 49 27 18 94 
Public Financing 0 16 0 9 25 
Solicitation 0 9 9 0 18 
Total 16 220 99 72 407 
 
                                               
4 The “shareholder rights” issue is addressed briefly in other cases, such as First National Bank of Boston v. 
Bellotti and Citizens United v. FEC,  but was usually addressed as an argument in favor of limits on corporate 





Spending limits are by far the most frequently voted-upon issue, and have been prominent in 
every era.  Contribution limits and disclosure/record keeping have also been the subject of 
many votes, with public financing and solicitation being less prominent. 
 An examination of each justice’s voting record provides a first clue as to where 
inconsistencies, and thus evidence of changed minds, may be found.  I have reported tables 
for selected justices below.  (Remaining results are available from the author).  An 
examination of these voting records immediately reveals some interesting insights into the 
justices’ voting behavior.  A few justices only voted on one or two cases, so it is difficult to 
draw many conclusions from their tables.  As for the justices who voted in several cases, 
however, the most ideologically consistent are Byron White and Clarence Thomas.  White 
cast 96% of his votes in a liberal direction (see Table 3-2), and Thomas cast 95% of his votes 
in a conservative direction (Table 3-3).  Thomas proves to be even more conservative than 
Justice Scalia, who cast 83% of his votes in a conservative direction (Table 3-4).  The 
difference in these two conservative icons’ voting records comes largely from their 
differences on the disclosure issue, where Scalia has generally been supportive of disclosure 
and recordkeeping provisions, but Thomas has maintained his stance that they are 







Table 3-2:  Justice White Votes by Issue and Direction 
        Issue      
Decision 
Direction 








































Table 3-3:  Justice Thomas Votes by Issue and Direction 
         Issue      
Decision 
Direction 








































Table 3-4:  Justice Scalia Votes by Issue and Direction 
         Issue      
Decision 
Direction 








































 One result that may seem surprising is that Justice Rehnquist, generally considered 
very conservative—Jeffrey Segal once referred to him as the “poster child for the attitudinal 
model” (Segal 2005)—has actually cast more liberal votes (58%) than conservative ones 
(36%) on campaign finance issues (Table 3-5).  These votes may be explained in part by two 
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factors.  First, Justice Rehnquist was very supportive of states’ rights, and often inclined to 
rule in favor of state regulations.  Additionally, he regarded claims of constitutional rights by 
corporations to be suspect, due to their nature as creations of state statute. 
 
Table 3-5:  Justice Rehnquist Votes by Issue and Direction 
         Issue      
Decision 
Direction 






















































 Justices Kennedy and O’Connor are often regarded as swing votes.  In campaign 
finance, however, O’Connor appears to have been much more of a potential swing vote than 
Kennedy.  Kennedy cast 76% of his votes in a conservative direction (Table 3-6), and of his 
five liberal votes, three of them were cast on disclosure and record-keeping issues, in which 
many of his typically conservative colleagues joined him in casting liberal votes.  O’Connor, 
however, cast more liberal votes (58%) than conservative (42%) (Table 3-7).   
Table 3-6:  Justice Kennedy Votes by Issue and Direction 
         Issue      
Decision 
Direction 










































Table 3-7:  Justice O’Connor Votes by Issue and Direction 
         Issue      
Decision 
Direction 








































 These descriptive results already provide some evidence that justices do not always 
follow clear ideological patterns in the campaign finance cases.  The next step of the analysis 
examines instances where justices have actually changed their position on an issue, and 
whether there is any detectable influence from party or amici briefs that influences the 
changes. 
Changing Minds 
 The simple crosstabs of justice’s votes show that justices do not always vote along 
simple ideological lines, and that they sometimes vote in opposite directions on the same 
issue area.   There are at least two possible reasons for the latter phenomenon.  First, issues 
that arise within the same general area may nonetheless be distinguishable from one another.  
For example, in the “spending” issue area, it may matter, at least to some justices, whether 
the spending is carried out by individuals or by entities such as business corporations, unions, 
and non-profit corporations.  Other instances of apparently contradictory votes by the same 
justice, however, may genuinely be cases in which a justice has changed his or her mind on 
an issue.  Such instances are especially important to examine, as this is where evidence of 
persuasive influence from advocates may be found. 
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 In order to identify changes in a justice’s position, I first used crosstabs of a justice’s 
votes to identify each instance in which a justice has voted inconsistently within a particular 
issue area.  I then read the decisions the justices wrote or joined in that issue area to 
determine whether the inconsistent votes simply represent legal distinctions—such as the 
difference between individual and corporate spending—or actual changes in doctrinal 
position by justices.  The vast majority of apparently inconsistent votes represent legal 
distinctions, rather than changes in position.  However, at least three justices have changed 
their positions notably over time—Stevens, Marshall, and O’Connor. 
Justice Stevens and the Money/Speech Equivalence 
 In First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, the first campaign finance case in which 
Justice Stevens participated, the Court considered the constitutionality of a Massachusetts 
law prohibiting business corporations from making expenditures or contributions to influence 
the outcome of ballot measures, unless those ballot measures materially affected the property, 
business, or assets of the corporation.  Justice Stevens joined Justice Powell’s majority 
opinion, which stated that the issue in question was not whether corporations have First 
Amendment rights, but whether the type of speech in question was the type of speech the 
First Amendment sought to protect. Powell found the speech the appellant wished to engage 
in “at the heart of the First Amendment’s protection” and struck down the Massachusetts 
statute.  Notably, Justice Rehnquist filed a dissenting opinion arguing in part that because 
corporations are creations of the state, states should have wide leeway in regulating them. 
 While Stevens joined Powell’s decision in Bellotti, he also joined Justice Rehnquist’s 
dissenting opinion in FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, in which the Court upheld an 
as-applied challenge by a non-profit corporation to a FECA provision prohibiting direct 
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expenditure of corporate funds in connection with election to public office.  Rehnquist’s 
opinion, concurring on one point but dissenting from the ultimate conclusion, stated that the 
Court should not attempt to carve out exemptions to the FECA provision for certain groups, 
and instead should defer to Congress’s judgment as to which groups should be included if the 
statute passes constitutional muster.  Rehnquist distinguished this from Bellotti (and Stevens 
later mentioned the same distinction in his Austin concurrence) on the grounds that it 
involved candidate elections, and not ballot measures.  The shift from Bellotti to MCFL is 
not, in itself, a true change of position, because of the ballot measure/election distinction, but 
is an early suggestion that Stevens was becoming more deferential toward regulation of 
corporate spending and contributions. Stevens’ position continued to evolve in Austin, where 
he agreed with the majority that a state prohibition on using corporate treasury funds in 
connection with a candidate election was constitutional.  In a brief concurrence, however, 
Stevens stated the following:  
In my opinion the distinction between individual expenditures and 
individual contributions that the Court identified in Buckley v. Valeo, should 
have little, if any, weight in reviewing corporate participation in candidate 
elections. In that context, I believe the danger of either the fact, or the 
appearance, of quid pro quo relationships provides an adequate justification 
for state regulation of both expenditures and contributions. Moreover, as we 
recognized in First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, there is a vast 
difference between lobbying and debating public issues on the one hand, and 
political campaigns for election to public office on the other.   




(Italics in original; citations and footnotes omitted). 
 Although Stevens continued to maintain a distinction between discussion of public 
issues and campaign spending (and thus justified his position in Bellotti), his position 
ultimately shifted between Bellotti and Nixon.  In Bellotti, Stevens agrees that a statute which 
limits a corporation’s ability to spend money to influence a ballot measure strikes at “the 
heart” of First Amendment interests.  By contrast, in a concurring opinion in Nixon v. Shrink 
Missouri Government PAC, Stevens argued (in a case upholding Missouri contribution limits) 
that money and speech were NOT identical and NOT entitled to the same level of protection:  
 Money is property; it is not speech.  
Speech has the power to inspire volunteers to perform a multitude of tasks on 
a campaign trail, on a battleground, or even on a football field. Money, 
meanwhile, has the power to pay hired laborers to perform the same tasks. It 
does not follow, however, that the First Amendment provides the same 
measure of protection to the use of money to accomplish such goals as it 
provides to the use of ideas to achieve the same results. 
 
 (Citations and footnotes omitted).       
Stevens’ concurring opinion in Nixon is where his shift becomes definitive—from agreeing 
that a restriction on corporate spending on a ballot initiative “goes to the heart of free speech” 
to the view that spending money, even when that money is spent to disseminate political 
ideas, is use of property, not speech.  While Stevens may not have recognized this change as 
such, it represents a significant change in the way he views the use of money for political 
speech.      
 There are two ways we might find evidence that a particular brief, or set of briefs, 
influenced Stevens change of heart, or at least the language used to express it.  One is to find 
some reference to briefs in his opinion.  In this case, he does not reference any briefs, either 
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by parties or amici.   Accordingly, we turn to the next method—computer assisted analysis of 
similarities between Stevens’ opinion and briefs. 
 In order to determine whether any such similarities exist, I used QDA Miner 
Qualitative Data analysis software.  QDA Miner contains a “Query by Example” function 
that allows the user to choose a phrase, sentence, paragraph, or entire document, and instruct 
the software to find linguistically similar sentences, paragraphs, or documents. 
 In this case, I conducted a separate query by example for each paragraph of Stevens’s 
dissent, with one exception.  The first paragraph of the dissent begins with some non-
substantive language to the effect that Justice Stevens is responding to Justice Thomas’s call 
to “begin anew” with campaign finance jurisprudence; he then suggests a new beginning in 
the final sentence of the paragraph, also quoted above, “Money is not speech, money is 
property.”  Because this was the only substantive portion of the paragraph that actually 
explained a legal position, I separated this sentence and chose to search for similar sentences, 
in addition to running a search on the entire paragraph. 
 QDA allows the user to select a similarity level between 0.001 and 0.1.  For each 
search, I chose a similarity level of .01, with a maximum of 200 results.  This was a low 
enough level to cast a wide net, but high enough to filter out some obviously unrelated 
sentences or paragraphs. (In deciding on the threshold, I did experiment with various levels 
of similarity to determine which had more or less “noise” in the form of clearly unrelated 
sentences or paragraphs, but did not examine the results in detail to determine whether any 
particular level of similarity tended to obtain positive results. The similarity level I selected 
still generated many “false positives” that had to be examined to determine if they actually 
concerned the same subject matter as the document with which those sentences and 
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paragraphs were to be compared).  I also enabled the software’s “fuzzy string matching” 
feature, which provides that when searching, it will treat different forms of the same root 
word as being the same word—so that it would recognize “decide” and “deciding”, for 
example, as the same. The software then generated a list of potential “hits” from the entire 
dataset of briefs and opinions, and displayed the similarity level for each.  It was necessary to 
then read each paragraph or sentence to determine if it was, in fact, similar in language and 
subject matter.  The vast majority of potential hits were eliminated because the similarities 
were non-substantive or coincidental.   
 Once a list of “hits” was generated, they were read carefully to determine if there 
was, in fact, any substantive similarity between the relevant portions of the briefs and 
relevant portions of the opinions.  In this case, I read each paragraph or sentence to determine 
whether it fit the following criteria: Did it make the argument made by Stevens in his pithy 
sentence—that money is not speech, but property? Some of the hits may contain similar 
language, but make an argument quite different from that made in the opinion—for example, 
someone using the phrase “money is not speech” could be arguing against that proposition. 
For this reason, simply searching for language similarities is not sufficient for this particular 
research question; each paragraph must be read and evaluated separately.5 
Once non-substantive and coincidental similarities were eliminated, seventeen hits 
were left that warranted further examination. Of these, two documents were found in the 
dataset which contained a similarity to the substantive sentence from paragraph 1 of Stevens’ 
Nixon concurrence. The first document is an amicus brief from Austin v. Michigan State 
Chamber of Commerce, a decision ten years older than Nixon.  In Austin, an amicus brief 
                                               
5 However, this coding obviously relies on human judgment, and would need to be replicated by another 
coder, with intercoder reliability checks, if this portion of the dissertation were prepared for publication. 
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filed by the Center for Public Interest Law argued against the equation of money and speech, 
stating “The expenditure of money is not speech. The act of spending money as one chooses 
is itself therefore afforded no particular constitutional protection.” This is the only known 
appearance of this argument in a brief prior to Justice Stevens’ concurring opinion in Nixon.  
In one sense, it is not a new argument; it has been made at least since Judge J. Skelly 
Wright’s law review article written in response to Buckley (Wright 1976).  But it appears the 
argument was not thought of seriously by advocates prior to Austin, probably because 
Buckley and subsequent decisions made clear, at least in Supreme Court doctrine, the money-
speech connection.  The decision in Austin maintained this connection, as it analyzed the 
statute at issue in a First Amendment frame work, finding that it burdened freedom of speech 
rights, but that the burden was justified because the law was narrowly tailored to serve a 
compelling state interest (the prevention of corruption through spending by corporations in 
support of or opposition to candidates).  Justice Stevens filed a concurring opinion in Austin 
as well, but it did not address the money-speech equivalency issue.  Accordingly, we have no 
direct evidence of an influence of this single brief upon Justice Stevens’ concurrence, several 
years later, in Nixon.  We do, however, see that it is possible for an idea raised in one case to 
still surface years later in another. 
 The second instance of a brief making the argument that money is not equivalent to 
speech is found in a case decided after Nixon.  In Randall v. Sorrell, decided six years after 
Nixon, an amicus brief filed by a group known as ReclaimDemocracy.Org made an extended 
argument in support of a Vermont campaign finance statute, based on the idea that money 
should not be equated to speech. Three of the hits came from portions of that brief. Their 
brief did not cite Justice Steven’ Austin concurrence, however, so there is no evidence his 
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adoption of that argument influenced their brief.   
 While Justice Stevens’ evolution on the question of money and speech is evident in 
his writing, it is unclear what role, if any, was played by legal advocates.   
 
Justice Marshall and the Contribution/Expenditure Distinction 
In Buckley v. Valeo, Justice Thurgood Marshall joined the Court’s per curiam majority 
opinion which, among other things, held that a distinction exists between financial 
contributions to candidates for federal offices, and independent expenditures made on behalf 
of such candidates.  The Buckley court gave two reasons for this distinction.  First, it claimed, 
independent expenditures had less potential to corrupt candidates and officeholders than 
contributions.  Second, limits on independent expenditures place a greater burden on political 
speech than do limits on contributions.   
 Although Marshall joined this opinion—meaning he signed on to its reasoning—he 
eventually rejected the contribution/expenditure distinction in his dissent in a later case, FEC 
v. National Conservative Political Action Committee (1985).  Marshall did not explicitly refer 
to any arguments made by parties or amici in this dissent.  Furthermore, using the same 
methods described above for the Stevens concurrence, there was no indication that the text of 
Marshall’s dissent, or its overall position on the issue, took its cues from any of the party of 
amicus briefs in that case.  One amicus brief, filed by a group known as U.S. Term Limits, 
did argue that ALL campaign finance regulation, whether of contributions or expenditures, is 
unconstitutional.  However, Marshall reached the opposite conclusion, stating that, while 
there was no principled distinction between the two categories, he would have upheld the 
limitations on expenditures at issue in the NCPAC case. 
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 If anything, it appears that Marshall’s conviction that the contribution/expenditure 
distinction should be abandoned dates back to his own concurring opinion in Buckley.  
Although he did not explicitly draw this conclusion in that opinion, he did state his 
disagreement with the per curiam opinion as to the rationale for upholding some campaign 
finance restrictions.  The per curiam opinion made the primary rationale for upholding 
campaign finance regulation the possibility of “quid pro quo” corruption, and described the 
interest of equalizing political participation as merely an “ancillary” interest.  Marshall’s 
Buckley concurrence, however, stated that he regarded the most important rationale for 
campaign finance regulation to be the “interest in promoting the reality and appearance of 
equal access to the political arena,” and he cited that interest again in describing his change 
of position on the contribution/expenditure distinction. 
Notably, in Buckley, Justice Blackmun, who concurred in parts of the per curiam 
opinion and dissented from others, stated that he did not believe the Court had made or could 
make a principled distinction between contributions and expenditures.  The possibility that 
this distinction would not hold water, then, has been around since Buckley, although the 
search found no evidence that party or amici briefs picked up on Justice Blackmun’s 
questioning of this distinction.  There is also no way of knowing, of course, whether Justice 
Blackmun influenced his colleague Marshall on this point.  It appears, however, that 
Marshall’s change of opinion was driven at least in part by his own principles as to the 






Justice O’Connor and Independent Expenditures 
Justice O’Connor has changed her mind twice on an issue that recurs in multiple 
campaign finance cases before the Court:  the ability of the federal government to regulate 
independent election-related expenditures by corporations. Unfortunately, in the three 
decisions in which O’Connor took a position on these issues, she only wrote an opinion in 
one of them.  In Massachusetts Citizens for Life v. FEC, she joined most of the opinion of the 
Court written by Justice Brennan, though she declined to join one section which was joined 
by only three other justices. 
In the portions of the opinion that O’Connor joins, the Court concludes that 
independent, campaign-related expenditures by Massachusetts Citizens for Life, a non-profit, 
non-stock corporation, are governed by the FECA provisions on corporate expenditures, 
which prohibit campaign related spending from corporate treasuries. The Court then holds 
that the relevant FECA provisions are unconstitutional as applied to Massachusetts Citizens 
for Life.  MCFL, the Court reasoned, was formed for the express purpose of engaging in 
political advocacy, had no shareholders, was not formed by a corporation or union, and had a 
policy of not accepting donations from corporations or unions.  Accordingly, the compelling 
interests that allowed regulation of for-profit corporations and unions did not apply to 
corporations such as MCFL.  The plurality section of the opinion, which O’Connor did not 
join, explains that disclosure requirements of the pertinent FECA section burden MCFL’s 
First Amendment liberties.  O’Connor wrote a concurrence arguing that the First Amendment 
burden comes not from the disclosure requirements, but from the special organizational 
requirements imposed on groups such as MCFL by FECA.  Nevertheless, she agreed with the 
majority of the Court’s opinion and concurred in the judgment. 
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 A few years later, however, O’Connor apparently changed her position on this issue, 
when she joined Justice Kennedy’s dissent in Austin v. Michigan State Chamber of 
Commerce.  The majority opinion in Austin held that corporations, including non-profits, 
could be prohibited from endorsing or opposing candidates with funds from their own 
treasuries (although they can use separate, segregated funds for these activities).  Justice 
Kennedy’s dissent, however, argues that the prohibition of campaign spending by non-profit 
corporations—not just those that meet the MCFL criteria--is unconstitutional on its face, not 
just as applied to certain types of corporations.  Since Justice O’Connor joined Kennedy’s 
dissent, we can assume that she agrees with his reasoning.  Accordingly, I searched for 
similarities between Kennedy’s dissent and the Austin briefs for clues as to what might have 
changed Justice O’Connor’s mind. 
 In order to search for similarities in the Kennedy dissent and the briefs in Austin, I 
used the same paragraph-level search query as described above.  While the search turned up 
656 paragraphs in various documents that met the minimum search criterion, a review of the 
potential hits showed that there were no substantive similarities of the type that would 
indicate that Kennedy’s dissenting opinion borrowed language from a party or amicus brief.  
In fact, the greatest similarity between a paragraph in Kennedy’s dissent and a paragraph in a 
brief (5.9% of words) involved a paragraph in the State of Michigan’s brief, taking a position 
quite different from that taken by Kennedy’s dissent. Indeed, all the paragraph similarities in 
the list of potential hits appear to be incidental—they may involve language that is 
commonly used in discussing this general topic, such as a description of a party’s argument 
or a summary of past relevant decisions—such that there is no indication that any briefs were 
important to the substance of Kennedy’s dissent. 
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 Thirteen years after Austin, Judge O’Connor again changed her mind on this issue.  In 
McConnell v. FEC, she co-authored an opinion with Justice Stevens, in which she held that 
corporations and unions can be required to pay for issue advertisements from separately 
segregated funds, rather than from corporate treasuries.  While this situation is somewhat 
different from that in Austin, which involved direct mention of candidates in advertisements, 
the Court has generally been more restrictive of direct mention of candidates than of issue 
advertisements.  Justice O’Connor’s decision to uphold restrictions on issue advertisements, 
however, in spite of having previously expressed an opposition to regulation of direct 
candidate endorsement or opposition, reflect an overall change in her thinking regarding 
corporate campaign spending. 
 As with Justice O’Connor’s previous change in position, however, a comparison of 
the opinion and briefs at the paragraph level reveals little evidence that arguments from the 
briefs influenced Justice O’Connor.  The greatest similarity between paragraphs (7.8%) 
comes from a footnote in the appellant brief summarizing the purpose of campaign finance 
disclosure provisions.  A few other potential “hits” are from briefs with paragraphs 
explaining the rationale and purpose of the prohibition on electioneering communications 
(independent expenditures) that were at issue in McConnell, but the actual similarities in 
language usage are minimal (less than 5% of the same words in each paragraph that is similar 
to a paragraph from the opinion).  The greatest similarities (between 3% and 5%) were seen 
in paragraphs in amicus briefs explaining the history and justification of restrictions on 
spending from corporate treasuries.  These briefs were filed by the League of Women Voters 
and several small groups which banded together under the umbrella “Community 
Organizations Dedicated to Defending the Civil Rights of Racial Minorities.”  
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 In fact, the joint opinion by Stevens’ and O’Connor relies heavily and explicitly on 
two documents:  the trial court opinion and a Senate report on campaign corruption.  With 
regard to issue advertising, the trial Court made specific findings that were cited in Stevens’ 
and O’Connor’s opinions.  The trial court heard extensive evidence cited by Stevens and 
O’Connor that there had been an increase in issue advertising as a means to circumvent limits 
on corporate spending.  After MCFL, non-profit corporations could use donations from for-
profit corporations and wealthy donors to run issue ads which did not run afoul on the 
prohibitions of direct spending on campaign-related advertising by for-profit corporations.  
They also cited several portions of a 1998 Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs 
investigation into the campaign finance practices during the 1996 election.  The reliance on 
facts from these two documents show a willingness on Justice O’Connor’s part to adjust her 
thinking on legal matters based on changing facts—the growth in issue ads, for example, was 
a development that occurred between Austin and McConnell.  This is an important finding in 
itself, worth further investigation.  There is no indication, however, that any of the party 
briefs or amicus briefs were particularly influential on O’Connor. 
 
Conclusion 
 This chapter first reviewed voting patterns by justices to determine whether there 
were inconsistencies in the direction of their votes on the important issue categories in 
campaign finance cases.  The subsequent section then examined three cases in which justices 
changed their minds on important issues, and searched for instances where the language used 
by justices when taking new positions was drawn from briefs filed by parties or amici.  There 
was little evidence found in these cases that the justices drew language from briefs filed in 
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the cases, and hence little evidence that arguments made in briefs led the justices to take a 
position they might otherwise not have expected to take.   
 It may well be that the influence of legal arguments on justices’ thinking operates in a 
nuanced manner that is difficult to detect using the tests found in this chapter.  An argument 
might influence a justices’ thinking without the justice explicitly acknowledging it, or 
explicitly adopting the language used in that argument.  However, there might be other 
indications of influence in language usage. It is entirely possible for two documents to 
discuss the same topic without using exactly the same words.  By identifying clusters of 
words or phrases that frequently refer to a particular topic, it might be possible to determine 
when two documents are discussing a common concept even if using slightly different 
language—for example, “quid pro quo,” “undue influence,” and “public perception” are all 
phrases that the courts have used in discussing the problem of corruption that campaign 
finance laws often seek to address.  
The following chapter builds on this possibility by examining the use of issue framing 












Framing Over time and the Effect of Issue Framing 
 As discussed in Chapter 2, I theorized that the development of campaign finance law 
in the Supreme Court can be divided into four eras or periods:  Pre-Buckley, the Buckley Era, 
New Deference, and Deregulation.  The first half of this chapter tests the theorized 
characteristics of these eras, while the second half tests the effects of issue framing across the 
four eras. 
 The analysis in Chapter 2 has already shown that the four eras can be distinguished 
by the Court’s favorability toward campaign finance reform (measured by justice’s votes on 
issues).  I further theorize that the eras can be distinguished by Court’s use of issue framing 
to define the key issues present in each era, and my analysis provides evidence to support 
that hypothesis. This is one of the most important contributions of this study, in that it offers 
independent, empirical support for an understanding of the development of campaign finance 
law that was based on a more traditional legal analysis. 
After demonstrating the distinctions between eras in terms of framing, this turns to 
comparing documents’ use of frames to test the similarity between briefs and opinions. My 
goal is to determine whether the frames used in Court opinions are more similar to the 
Court’s past cases, or more similar to the briefs filed with the Court.  If the Court’s use of 
language is being influenced primarily by its own precedents, I would expect a Court opinion 
to be more similar to the Court’s past decisions than to the briefs filed in the case. If the 
arguments used in briefs are having an influence, I would expect the analyzed case to be 
more similar to those briefs than to past cases. 
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 Finally, I analyze whether briefs are adding something new to a particular case by 
analyzing the frames used in the lower court decisions that each Supreme Court case in the 
study was appealed from. To some extent, Supreme Court briefs can be expected to employ 
similar frames to those used in the lower court decision, as they have to explain why the 
lower court decision was correct or incorrect. However, at the Supreme Court stage, 
advocates also have a chance to make arguments that reframe the issues in a manner different 
from the framing used by the lower court. This gives advocates, especially those not happy 
with the lower court decision, a chance to highlight aspects of the case that are not the focus 
of the lower court opinion. If advocates adopt a frame that is not found in the lower court 
decision, and succeed in having the Supreme Court adopt that frame, they have potentially 
changed the way that Court treats a particular subject—thus not only helping to secure a 
victory in their own case, but influencing the direction of legal doctrine and future cases.  
 In previous work on framing effects in the courts, Wedeking (2010) succinctly 
defines frames and framing: “Frames are defined as a small collection of related words that 
emphasize some aspect of an issue at the expense of others. Framing is the selection of one 
particular frame over another, and framing effects occur when a frame shapes the thoughts 
and behavior of others.” (Wedeking 2010, 617).  The theoretical basis for framing theory is 
the idea that the way a communicator characterizes an issue can affect how the intended 
audience understands that issue. The same issue may be characterized in multiple ways—for 
example, the constitutionality of a campaign finance statute might be characterized as a 
matter of protecting freedom of speech, preventing corruption, maintaining public trust in 
government, or leveling the playing field between wealthy donors and less wealthy people 
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and individuals. Emphasizing one or more of those frames will, necessarily, de-emphasize 
others, and may affect the way an audience view an issue (Scheufele and Tewksbury 2007). 
 The study of framing effects offers a particularly promising method for understanding 
the effect of legal argument on Supreme Court opinions. Wedeking (2010) examined the 
effect of issue framing on Supreme Court opinions over the 1979 – 1989 terms and found 
that under certain conditions, framing effects can give litigants a greater chance of achieving 
their preferred outcome in the Supreme Court.  His larger-scale study was consistent with 
findings by Epstein and Kobylka’s (1992) study of legal change in Supreme Court cases on 
abortion and the death penalty, which also suggested that strategic issue framing helped 
litigants achieve significant policy changes in those areas.  
  
Detecting and Analyzing Frames 
 In addition to the differences in votes, the different eras should reflect different issue 
frames—different uses of word groupings which identify what a document is “about.”  There 
is no single, accepted way to identify issue frames. They may be identified through 
interpretive methods or using automated text classification software. (Chong and Druckman 
2007b).  In this case, text classification software, combined with human judgment, was used.   
 As the first step in identifying frames, I used Wordstat content analysis software to 
identify short phrases in the majority and plurality opinions in the document dataset.  These 
are the “target” documents, in that the study ultimately looks for similarities between these 
documents and briefs.  By using the majority and plurality documents, some words and 
phrases that may be more emphasized in briefs will inevitably be left out—e.g. some briefs 
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will make arguments that are simply ignored, and thus the particular word groupings that are 
in those briefs may not appear in the opinions.  Nevertheless, the use of the opinions as the 
basis for the analysis makes sense as the most efficient way to identify frames.  Because the 
analysis is looking for similarities, the frames from briefs not adopted by opinions will serve 
as “noise” that complicate the analysis.  In short, the analysis is looking for which arguments 
worked, not those that didn’t.  The other obvious objection to this method is that it biases the 
analysis by pre-selecting those issue frames which “made it” into the Court’s opinions.  
However, the coding of documents by issue frames will allow us to see which documents 
DID NOT employ frames that ultimately came to prevail in the Court’s opinion, as those 
documents will simply have fewer (or no) uses of those frames.   
I used Wordstat to find 2-3 word phrases that appear at least 3 times in the majority 
and plurality opinions.  I chose to use short phrases instead of single words due to the fact 
that phrases provide more information than mere groups of words. For example, the word 
“expenditure” may be used in a number of ways, but the phrase “expenditure limitation” 
provides more information about the topic being discussed than the word expenditure alone.  
It also allows for making distinctions between different uses of the same word, such as 
“expenditure limitation” and “large expenditure.” Using phrases, rather than words, was 
previously employed by Sim, et al. (2014) in their study of framing effects in Supreme Court 
amicus briefs.  
I did not set a minimum number of cases (documents) for each phrase to appear in, 
because it is possible that a phrase could appear in only one document and still be an 
important part of the frame for that particular document.  I also used an exclusion dictionary 
to eliminate words and phrases that are so common as to provide no insight into particular 
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frames used by the parties and the Court.  The exclusion dictionary is preprogrammed with 
Wordstat and includes, for example, common words such as articles and prepositions.  I also 
reviewed the list of phrases generated by Wordstat (over 3,000) and added some phrases to 
the exclusion list, if the phrases were irrelevant or so common that they tell little about the 
content of the legal arguments or legal doctrine.  For example, the phrase “district court” 
appears in almost every document, since some reference is normally made to lower court 
decisions.  My rule for eliminating phrases was to eliminate any phrase that is unlikely to be 
unique to a particular legal argument or frame because it is so common as to be likely to 
appear without reference to particular subject matter (e.g. “district court”), and any phrase 
obviously deals only with the subject matter in a very general way (e.g. “campaign finance,” 
“candidate”).    In a case of ambiguity as to whether a phrase should be included, I erred on 
the side of including the word. Excluded words were added to the exclusion dictionary, 
whereas included words were placed in a categorization dictionary. (The Exclusion 
Dictionary is included as Appendix 4-1). 
Finally, the categorization software utilizes “lemmatization,” meaning it recognizes 
different forms of the same root word and analyzes them as the same item. For example, it 
would treat “contribute” and “contributes” as the same word.  
 Once I excluded phrases according to the criteria above the remaining phrases were 
used to create a categorization dictionary containing over 1500 phrases.  Wordstat then 
“applies” this dictionary to any documents chosen, whether briefs or opinions, by finding 
their occurrences in those documents.  Once Wordstat has found the occurrences of phrases 
in documents, it can also be set to find clusters of phrases that occur together.  I applied my 
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categorization dictionary to the entire dataset of documents, comprising 450 opinions and 
briefs, to find occurrences of the phrases in the dictionary.  
  I then used Wordstat to find clusters of phrases in those documents in which phrases 
on the list appear in the same paragraph.  I only used clusters that contain at least three 
phrases, and eliminated single word clusters.  Wordstat also generates Jaccard’s coefficients 
for the phrases, in order to measure the degree to which phrases in the same cluster are 
connected.  This process resulted in 142 clusters of phrases in which the lowest Jaccard’s 
coefficient was at least 0.2.6  After eliminating clusters of fewer than three words, 51 clusters 
remained. Each cluster constitutes a “frame.” A list of frames is included in Appendix 4-2, 
with each frame listed by a name. The phrases in each cluster are also included under the 
name of the frame. I gave each frame a name based on either the most frequent phrase in the 
cluster, or from a word or phrase that indicates the common thematic thread tying together 
the words in that cluster.  Examples of frames include: “Public Debate,” “Political 
Communication,” “Real and Apparent Corruption,” and “Corruption and Speech.” 
In order to determine whether a particular frame is employed by a document, 
Wordstat retrieves paragraphs which contain phrases from each cluster.  I specified that each 
paragraph must contain at least three phrases from a particular cluster in order to be 
considered to be using that frame. Using only one or two phrases from a particular frame in a 
paragraph could be coincidental, and might not truly reflect an emphasis on a particular 
frame. However, the use of three such related phrases is more likely to reflect an intention to 
                                               
6 Each cluster may have multiple Jaccard’s coefficients.  For example, if a cluster contains of three phrases 
(Phrase A, B, and C), and A and B are the closest together, the program will generate a Jaccard’s coefficient for 
the similarity between Phrase A and Phrase B.  It will then treat phrase A and B together as a “subcluster” and 
generate a second coefficient for the similarity between Phrase C and the subcluster.   
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use a particular frame. Each paragraph in a document that employs a particular frame is then 
coded with that frame.  Some paragraphs will not have a code, as they do not contain at least 
three of the phrases in a particular cluster.  A few paragraphs employ more than one frame, 
and are coded with each frame they use if this is the case. 
After the documents were coded according to the presence of frames, Wordstat 
calculated, separately, which frames occurred in the opinions and briefs.  Forty-one separate 
frames appeared in the opinions, while forty-six separate frames appeared in the briefs.  
Because the briefs may raise lines of argument that are ignored by opinions, it is unsurprising 
that the briefs contain more frames than the opinions. 
In addition to generating the list of frames present in the documents, Wordstat 
calculates, for each frame in each era, what percentage of the total framing usages in each era 
are associated with a particular frame. For example, a percentage calculation of 28.6% for the 
frame “Corruption and Speech” in the pre-Buckley era means that 28.6% of the framing 
occurrences in that era were occurrences of that particular frame.  This calculation provides 
an overview of which frames were most prevalent in each era.  Because many of the frames 
have very small percentages, I prepared tables showing only those frames which compose at 








Table 4-1: Frames by Era in Majority and Plurality Opinions 
(Code Counts and Column Percentages) 
(Only contains frame codes that accounted for 5% of the coded segments 
























































































 The above table, which shows the results for frames in majority and plurality opinions 
only, provides some insight into the using of framing by the court’s opinions.  
Unsurprisingly, the frame “corruption and speech” is the most prevalent in each era.  It is not 
the only frame related to free speech, nor the only one related to corruption, but this 
particular frame contains phrases indicating the court’s attempts to balance concerns about 
corruption in electoral politics with concerns about freedom of speech.  The “unions and 
corporations frame” (indicating concern with influence in the political process from both 
unions and corporations) was clearly more important to the pre-Buckley era than to others. 
Note that this does not mean that this type of concern only appears in that particular era, but 
only that a particular way of framing it is particularly associated with that era.  The concern 
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over corporate influence, and to a lesser extent over union influence, has been a perennial 
topic of concern to campaign finance reformers, and the Court’s opinions throughout the 
various eras reflect that.  For example, the “corporations” frame appears in all four of the 
eras. “Electioneering communications” was most prominent in the Deregulation and New 
Deference eras, which perhaps reflect the fact that those eras contain cases which dealt in 
great depth with the problem of independent expenditures related to campaigns and elections. 
 The results of Table 4-2, below, show some interesting differences and similarities 
between the use of framing by the opinions and the briefs. 
Table 4-2: Frames by Era in Party and Amicus Briefs 
(Code Counts and Column Percentages) 
 
(Only contains frame codes that accounted for 5% of the coded segments 





















































































 Like the opinions, the briefs contain only eight frames that compose at least 5% of the 
framing occurrences in at least one era.  As with the opinions, the most prominent frame 
among the briefs, regardless of era, was “Corruption and Speech.” Aside from “Corruption 
and Speech”, the frames “Corporations,” “Unions and Corporations,” “Public Finance,” 
“Congressional Intent,” and “Electioneering Communication” appear in the table of most 
prominent frames for both brief and opinions.  The fact that six out of the eight frames appear 
in both tables indicates a fairly significant overlap in the use of framing by the briefs and 
opinions, but not a perfect one.  Note that “Limits on Association” and “Coordinated 
Expenditure” appear only in the opinions table, which could indicate that the Court, more 
than the authors of briefs, found that these frames provided useful for discussing the subject 
matter of these opinions.  On the other hand, the frames “Public Debate” and “Equal 
Protection” appear only in the briefs table, indicating that the Court did not follow the briefs 
in using these particular frames.  
 The difference in frame usage among the four eras is reflected visually in Figures 4-1 
and 4-2, which show 2-D correspondence plots of the relationships between various frames 
and the extent to which frames are associated with particular eras.  Wordstat prepared these 
plots based on the calculations of framing code occurrences, plus the proximity of framing 
codes to one another.  Figure 4-1 shows the correspondence of frames in the opinions, and 
Figure 4-2 shows the correspondence of frames in the briefs. Essentially, the closer together 
two framing codes are on the correspondence plot, the more likely they are to appear 
together. Frames that appear close to one another are likely to appear in the same document, 
while those that are further apart are less likely to appear in the same document. In addition 
to plotting the correspondence of individual codes, the plots are divided into four quadrants, 
95 
 
each corresponding to an era, in order to display the extent to which frames are associated 
with certain eras. Those frames near the center of the graphs are more likely to appear in 
multiple areas, while those nearer the edges are more likely to appear in only in that era. 
 













These figures show the extent to which three of the eras (New Deference, 
Deregulation, and Buckley) share certain frames, in that they are all clustered toward the 
center of the graph.  Nevertheless, the graphs also show that these three eras appear in 
distinct quadrants, indicating their difference in the use of various frames.  The pre-Buckley 
era is an outlier in both graphs, which is unsurprising considering that some of the legal 
issues and concerns present in later eras had not fully developed in that era.  The distribution 
of the eras is also quite similar on both graphs, although the Buckley era is closer to the 
Deregulation era on the opinions graph, and closer to the New Deference era on the briefs 
graph.   
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 Combined with the voting results by era discussed in Chapter 2, the distribution of 
frames among eras further supports the hypothesis that the four eras of campaign finance 
jurisprudence are distinguishable in their treatment of this complicated subject matter.  Not 
only are the eras distinguishable in terms of voting results, but also in terms of language.  As 
the two-dimensional correspondence plots above vividly illustrate, each era tends to focus 
more on certain frames than others.  On the other hand, the distribution of frames also 
provides a reminder that certain core concerns persist through all four eras—most notably, 
the Court’s attempt to balance concerns over corruption with free speech values.  
 The findings concerning the similarities and differences in framing across eras are 
important for two reasons. First, the similarities demonstrate that both courts and advocates 
are consistent in recognizing that certain concerns recur in multiple cases. The courts 
continue to see some aspects of the issues, such as free speech, as important throughout time, 
even if the different courts disagree on the meaning of free speech. Accordingly, this offers 
some support for the idea that legal precedent has an important role to play in terms of 
defining how an issue is discussed—in other words, how it is framed. Once Buckley v. Valeo 
established the importance of the free speech in analyzing campaign finance laws, that aspect 
of the subject has never been abandoned. In that respect, the persistence of frames confirms 
the importance of legal precedent as providing not just a guide to case outcomes, but a 
common language with which to communicate about an issue over time. The persistence of 
some frames in briefs, as well as opinions, indicates that advocates employ this common 
language as well. 
 The second major contribution here relates to the differences in framing across eras. 
As described in Chapter 2, I theorized that the different eras would be distinguishable based 
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on my reading of a series of articles by legal scholar (and political scientist) Rick Hasen that 
employed a fairly traditional model of legal analysis, in that they focused on the content of 
doctrine, changes in that doctrine, and its relative coherence or lack thereof. My framing 
analysis provides empirical support for an analysis conducted by more traditional, 
interpretive methods. On the one hand, the framing analysis does not provide the kind of 
detailed doctrinal understanding found in the Hasen articles and other, similar articles 
typically found in law reviews. Instead, this study provides verifiable empirical evidence 
concerning change and stability in language usage over time.  
 
Testing the Effect of Briefs Using Frames 
 The previous chapters have focused on legal argument, and framing is related to, but 
not exactly the same as, legal argument.  Note that framing reflects, to some extent, the 
subject matter of a document as well as particular legal arguments.  It is possible, however, 
that two opposing arguments may actually employ the same frame.  For example, two 
litigants on opposite sides may both frame their arguments in terms of the “Corruption and 
Speech” frame, but offer differing takes on how the Court should rule.  When one party 
employs a different frame than its adversary, however (or when the Court uses a different 
frame than a prior decision on similar issues), what occurs is not merely the making of a 
different argument but a change in subject matter.  (Wedeking 2010; Riker 1986). 
Once the briefs and opinions have been coded according to their use of frames, it is 
possible to test some hypotheses regarding framing effects.   Like Wedeking (2010), I am 
interested in whether framing effects have the potential to turn the tide for litigants who are 
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faced with a situation in which they are unlikely to prevail, by changing the terms of the 
debate.  My theory of framing effects differs from Wedeking (2010), however, which tests 
the ability of respondents to overcome their inherent disadvantage in the Supreme Court by 
using framing effects.  (Respondents are generally at a disadvantage in the Court, since the 
Court’s taking a case often means that it agrees with a petitioner’s view). 
My general theory of framing effects, however, depends on the relationship of 
different frames to different eras, rather than the status of litigants as respondents or 
petitioners. As was shown in Chapter 2, each era can be characterized, generally speaking, as 
pro- or anti-reform.  A litigant who takes a position opposite the general trend of that era will 
need to do something out of the ordinary to convince the Court to side with them.  This is 
where the use of framing effects is potentially important.  If litigants can use their choice of 
language to frame the issues in a certain way, they have a better chance of success.  I will test 
this by determining whether a brief or a past opinion is the closest, in terms of framing, to a 
given opinion.  
In general, I would expect opinions from the same era to be very similar to each other 
in terms of framing (and the figures above support that).  If an advocate’s use of frames can 
affect the Court’s view of how a case should be framed, however, I would expect one or 
more briefs, and not a previous opinion, to be more similar to the instant case, with regard to 
its use of framing.  Accordingly, my first hypothesis with regard to framing effects is as 
follows: 
If a decision follows the general trend of that era (in terms of being for or against 
reform), the most proximate document will be a prior opinion. On the other hand, if a 
100 
 
decision is contrary to the general trend for that era, a brief will be the most proximate 
document.   
The similarity of documents’ use of frames is calculated using QDA Miner Software, 
a companion program to Wordstat.  QDA computes the occurrences of each frame in each 
document, and generates a cosine to signify the similarity in coding frequencies between 
documents.  The user selects one or more “target documents”, and selects which other 
documents from the dataset will be tested against the target document(s).  QDA then uses a 
“vector space model” to quantify the similarity of each of the selected documents to the 
target document.  This type of model represents text as a vector of terms. “Terms” can be 
defined in various ways, and most vector space models used to analyze text define words or 
phrases as terms. Because I have already coded paragraphs with framing codes, here I used 
the framing codes themselves as terms. This serves the purposes of my analysis, as I seek to 
analyze the similarity in terms of framing, and not only specific phrases. This distinction is 
important because a particular frame might include, say twelve different phrases. It is 
unlikely that any single paragraph uses all twelve of those phrases, even if they are often 
linked in various combinations. However, one paragraph might employ three of the phrases, 
while another employs one of the same phrases, plus two others from that frame. Note that 
Appendix 4-2 contains a list of the frames, and all the phrases in each frame. 
In calculating a vector for each term, QDA treats each term as a dimension in a multi-
dimensional vector space. If a term, in this case a framing code, is found in a document, that 
term is assigned a value in the vector for the dimension corresponding to that term. The 
greater the number of times a term appears in a document, the higher its assigned vector 
value will be. (Singal 2001). 
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To assign a numeric value to measure the similarity between documents, QDA 
measures cosines of the angles between vectors. The angles between vectors measure the 
divergence between vectors—a larger angle equals greater dissimilarity. The cosine of an 
angle, however, measures the similarity between vectors. The cosine of an angle—keep in 
mind these are vectors in imaginary space-- is the ratio of the length of the adjacent side of an 
angle to the length of the hypotenuse. A cosine will be between 0 and 1, with 0 indicating 
complete dissimilarity, and 1 indicating identical vectors. (Singal 2001). 
So, in order to use the vector space model to determine the similarity of documents’ 
use of frames, QDA Miner calculates a cosine coefficient between 0 and 1 to measure the 
similarity between a given set of documents and a designated target document. In terms of 
interpreting similarity, the more similar two cases are in terms of their distribution of codes, 
the higher the coefficient is.   
Using this method for each majority or plurality opinion, I tested the similarity of all 
briefs filed in that case, and all prior opinions (whether majority, concurring, or dissenting).  
I ran a separate test for each majority and plurality opinion, in which I treated each of these 
opinions as a target document, testing each opinion’s proximity, or similarity, to all prior 
opinions, and to the briefs filed in the case.  Some cases had more than one opinion; if a 
majority or plurality opinion was broken up into parts with different coalitions, I treated each 
separate part as a different opinion, and accordingly a different target document.  (For 
example, Part I of opinion authored by Justice A and joined by Justices B, C, D, and E; Part 
II of opinion authored by Justice B and joined by justices D, E, F, G and H). The reasons for 
this were twofold—first, the different parts of an opinion may reach separate conclusions, 
and therefore draw from different precedents and briefs.  Second, the various parts have 
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different authors and/or coalitions joining them, so each separate part of an opinion may 
reflect different framing. 
A representative proximity plot and co-occurrence table, those for Buckley v. Valeo, 
are shown below in Figure 4-3 and Table 4-3. 









Table 4-3: Buckley Majority Co-occurrence Table   
(Similarity to Buckley Majority Opinion) 
 




California Fair Political Practices 
Commission, et al. 







U.S. Attorney General Amicus Pro-Reform Winning 0.933 
Appellee Brief Pro-Reform Winning 0.880 
U.S. v. UAW-CIO Majority Pro-Reform N/A 0.764 
U.S. v. UAW-CIO Dissent Anti-
Reform 
N/A 0.495 





Interestingly, the most similar document in Buckley was an amicus brief from the 
California Fair Political Practices Commission, and a few other state elections commissions, 
arguing for the upholding of the Federal Election and Campaign Act Amendments of 1974.  
However, two briefs from the appellant, who is coded as being on the “losing” side were the 
next most proximate, and were more proximate than the appellee’s brief. In part, this reflects 
the complexity of Buckley, which upheld key parts of FECA but struck down the spending 
limits contained therein on First Amendment grounds; in other words, it may have been a 
victory on the whole for reformers, but not a complete one.  Accordingly, it is unsurprising to 
104 
 
see briefs from both sides very similar to the opinion.  Also note that the briefs, on the whole, 
were more proximate to the opinion than the two previous opinions in this area, indicating 
the transitional nature of Buckley into a new era where freedom of speech concerns become 
central to campaign finance cases.  Additionally, two amicus briefs were not included in this 
table, as they had no coding similarities with the majority opinion. 
In order to demonstrate, in practical terms, what the similarity results mean, I have 
included a table showing framing codes included in the Buckley majority and the briefs filed 
in that case, as well as the framing codes from a previous case, United States v. UAW-CIO. In 
order to make the table easier to read, I omitted the two least similar documents, and omitted 
frames that appear only once in the majority opinion and do not appear in any briefs.  These 
results are in Table 4-4, below. Beneath the name of each document, I have included its 
cosine coefficient showing its similarity to the Buckley majority. 
Table 4-4: Framing Codes in Buckley Documents 























25 8 11 4 6 20 2 
Invidious 
Discrimination 
4 1   4 21  
Public Finance 4     3  
Representative 
Government 
4       
Disclosure 2   1  1  
Public Money 2       
Influence 2       
Public Debate 2       
Unions and 
Corporations 
1     1 3 
War Chest 1     1  
Discussion of 
Candidates 




The above table helps to illustrate how the cosine coefficients measure the similarity 
between documents. As you can see, the most similar document, the “Fair Political Practices 
Amicus Brief” emphasized the “Corruption and Speech” Frame, as did the majority opinion, 
and also included the “Invidious Discrimination” Frame, which was also found in the 
majority opinion. The next most similar brief, the petitioner’s brief, also emphasized the 
“Corruption and Speech” frame, but did not include the Invidious Discrimination frame, 
therefore making it slightly less similar. Notice that the respondent brief, while emphasizing 
Corruption and Speech, also put a heavy emphasis on Invidious Discrimination, which was 
less emphasized in the Buckley opinion; this made its overall similarity to the opinion lower 
than some of the other documents. The cosine coefficient, then, signifies not just the 
presence of codes the frequency with which each code appears.  If a brief employs a 
particular frame numerous times, but the opinion only mentions it once, this is a distinct 
difference in emphasis, which is accounted for in the cosine coefficient. 
I also coded each opinion as to whether it was, on the whole, pro- or anti-reform.  In 
doing so I used the coding scheme developed in Chapter 2 when characterizing issue votes—
an opinion which upholds a campaign finance reform law (without weakening it 
significantly) or otherwise takes a deferential view toward campaign finance legislation is 
coded as “pro-reform.”  An opinion that overturns a campaign finance statute or that takes a 
more restrictive view of the statute (such as limiting its application or refusing to apply it to a 
particular party) is coded as “anti-reform.”  Even with the opinion split up into separate 
documents as described above, there were still several opinions or opinion segments that 
dealt with multiple issues.  In coding opinions as to whether they supported or opposed 
campaign finance reform, if an opinion had multiple issues, I coded it according to how the 
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majority of issues in that opinion (or portion of opinion) were resolved. While this coding 
was done after the application of framing data to the documents, my coding with regard to 
the pro- or anti-reform nature of each opinion did not change from the coding done in 
Chapter 2, which was performed before seeing the framing data.  Essentially, I took the issue 
vote coding in Chapter 2 and applied that coding to the opinion as a whole, based on the 
result of the majority of the issues dealt with in an opinion.  
Before testing my hypothesis, I calculated some descriptive statistics concerning the 
proximity of briefs and opinions.  Table 4-5 displays the extent to which briefs or opinions 
tended to be the most similar document to a target opinion. 
 
Table 4-5: Most Similar Document to Majority and Plurality Opinions 
Closest Document Freq. Percent Cum. 
No Difference 5 16.13 16.13 
Opinion 6 19.35 35.48 
Brief 20 64.52 100.00 
Total 31 100.00  
 
 
The results show that in 20 of the 31 opinions, or 64.52 percent, a brief and not a 
prior opinion was the most proximate document.  Additionally, in five out of the 31 opinions, 
there was a tie as to whether a brief or opinion was the most similar document (the “no 
difference” column).  While this does not, in itself, provide influence of briefs, it suggests, at 
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least, that some advocates are doing an excellent job of framing their arguments in terms that 
the Court accepts. 
 I also coded each opinion as to whether the most proximate brief was on the 
“winning” or “losing” side of the case, and calculated the frequency of winning versus losing 
briefs as most proximate.  The results are displayed in Table 4-6. 
Table 4-6: Side of Most Similar Brief in Each Case 
“Side” of Closest 
Brief  
Frequency Percent Cum. Percent 
Losing Side 12 37.5 37.5  
  
Winning Side 16 50 87.5 
Tie 4 12.5 100 
Total 32 100  
 
The most similar brief is only on the winning side in half of the cases; in 37.5% of the 
cases the losing brief is most proximate, and in the remainder of cases winning and losing 
briefs tied for most proximate.  This is actually consistent with my findings in an earlier 
chapter that when courts discuss arguments made by litigants, they devote a great deal of that 
discussion to the arguments they disagree with.  It also indicates that, in terms of framing, 
being the most similar to an opinion doesn’t necessarily mean you’re the winner.  The Court 
may discuss the issues on your terms, but still disagree with your argument—or it may be 
that both sides are discussing things on the same terms, so you cannot change the Court’s 
mind in your favor by framing the issues in a different way.7 
                                               
7 After obtaining these results, I tested whether unanimity of a decision affected whether the Court’s opinion 
showed more similarity to the winning or losing side of a case.  Because a non-unanimous case signifies 
division on the Court, it could be that authors of non-unanimous opinions feel a greater obligation to discuss 
and explicitly refute the losing side’s argument, meaning the most proximate brief or briefs in non-unanimous 
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Finally, I tested the hypothesis mentioned above:  If an opinion follows the general 
trend of its era, with regard to being pro- or anti- campaign finance reform, a prior opinion 
will be the most similar document; if it defies the trend of its era, a brief will be the closest 
document.  To test this, I coded each opinion for whether it follows the general trend of its 
era, and for whether an opinion or brief was the most similar document.  The results are in 
Table 4-7. 






























The crosstab results shown in Table 4-7 do not support the hypothesis regarding 
proximity.  Regardless of whether an opinion follows or defies the trend that characterizes its 
era, a brief is most likely to be the most similar document.  Furthermore, I could not perform 
a statistical test on the crosstab due to the small number of cases in some cells.  Nevertheless, 
the results in this table provide some important information regarding the extent to which an 
opinion is more likely to be most similar, in terms of framing, to a brief or a previous 
opinion. These results indicate that a brief is  likely to be the most similar document to the 
                                               
cases would be from the losing side.  However, an analysis of the non-unanimous cases showed little 
difference as to whether winning or losing side briefs were more proximate.   
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target opinion, regardless of whether that opinion follows or defies its era in being deferential 
or skeptical toward campaign finance reform.  This suggests that attorneys, even if they are 
not influencing the Court, are using the same type of language the Court uses in framing 
issues.  
Framing Effects and Transitional Cases 
 As a further test of framing effects, I examined similarities between briefs and 
opinions for transitional cases, which I define as the first case in each era beginning with 
Buckley.  (I do not count the first pre-Buckley case as a transition for this analysis, because 
there is no prior era to transition from.) This is another place in which influence of framing 
effects might be detected.  If the issue framing used by advocates is pushing the Court in a 
new direction, we would expect to see briefs being more similar than opinions in transitional 
cases.   
The proximity plot and co-occurrence table for Buckley, shown above, show that 
amicus and party briefs were substantially more similar than the previous opinions, in terms 
of framing, to the Buckley majority opinion.  Table 4-8, on the following page, shows the co-
occurrence results for Shrink Missouri Government PAC v. Nixon, the first case in the New 
Deference era (a few documents with cosines below .481 have been left out in order to make 






Table 4-8: Nixon Majority Documents Framing Similarity
Document Cosine 
United States Amicus Brief 0.989 
Common Cause Amicus Brief 0.982 
Petitioner Brief 0.977 
Former ACLU Leaders Amicus 0.977 
Brief of Respondent Bray 0.976 
House and Senate Members Amicus 0.976 
State Attorneys General Amicus 0.976 
Right to Life Amicus 0.976 
Respondent Shrink Missouri 0.975 
Petitioner Reply 0.972 
Sen. Mitch McConnell Amicus 0.972 
James Madison Center Amicus 0.971 
ACLU Amicus 0.970 
Kennedy Dissent 0.968 
DSCC Concurrence 0.968 
Public Citizen Amicus 0.968 
Shrink Missouri Supplemental Brief 0.968 
FEC v. Colorado Thomas Dissent Part 1 0.968 
FEC v. Colorado Stevens Dissent 0.968 
Buckley v. Valeo Burger Dissent 0.968 
Buckley v. Valeo White Dissent 0.968 
MCFL v. FEC Plurality Part III 0.968 
Brown v. Socialist Workers O’Connor Dissent 0.968 
Political Scientists Amicus 0.968 
First Amendment Project Amicus 0.967 
Secretaries of State Amicus  0.967 
Pacific Legal Foundation Institute 0.965 
U.S. Term Limits Amicus 0.961 
Buckley v. Valeo Majority Opinion 0.961 
Guns Owners of America Amicus 0.960 
California Medical Association v. FEC Plurality 0.950 
Citizens Against Rent Control v. Berkeley White Dissent 0.948 
Breyer Concurrence 0.941 
FEC v. Colorado Plurality 0.934 
FEC v. NCPAC Majority Part 2 0.920 
Colorado Republicans v. FEC Thomas Dissent Part 2 0.917 
Citizens Against Rent Control v. Berkeley Blackmun 
Concurrence 
0.914 
Citizens Against Rent Control Majority Opinion 0.914 
California Med Assn. v. FEC Blackmun Concurrence 0.896 
Austin v. FEC Scalia Dissent 0.842 
California Med. Assn. v. FEC Majority 0.821 
Citizens Against Rent Control Marshall Concurrence 0.821 
Buckley v. Valeo Burger Concurrence 0.821 
Austin v. FEC Majority 0.805 
Austin v. FEC Kennedy Dissent 0.790 
National Right to Work v. FEC Majority 0.766 
FNB v. Bellotti White Dissent 0.761 
U.S. v. UAW-CIO Majority 0.746 
Austin v. FEC Brennan Concur 0.705 
Brown v. Socialist Workers Majority 0.671 
FNB v. Bellotti Majority 0.661 
MCFL v. FEC Majority Parts IIIB and C 0.647 
FEC v. DSCC Majority 0.550 
Colorado Republicans v. FEC Kennedy Dissent 0.535 
Brown v. Socialist Workers Blackmun Concurrence 0.481 
U.S. v. UAW-CIO Douglas Dissent 0.481 





In this case, the most similar documents are amicus and party briefs, possibly 
indicating, again, some influence from framing effects in briefs in this transitional case.  The 
United States’ amicus brief is the most similar document, which could reflect the influence 
the Solicitor General has before the Court when it chooses to take part as an amicus.   
Finally, the results for the plurality opinion in Randall v. Sorrell, the first case in the 
Deregulation era, are shown in the table on the following page.  This opinion was split into 
two parts due to different coalitions of justices joining each part.  I have displayed only the 












Table 4-9: Framing Similarity in Randall v. Sorrell Plurality Part I Documents 
Document Cosine 
Souter Dissent Part I 0.988 
Plurality PartIIb1and2 0.988 
Stevens Dissent 0.988 
Kennedy Concurrence 0.988 
Sorrell VRSC Petitioner Reply 0.988 
The Rest of Us Amicus 0.988 
Secretaries of State Amicus 0.988 
Reclaim Democracy Amicus 0.988 
AFL-CIO Amicus 0.988 
Beaumont v. FEC Thomas Dissent 0.988 
DNC Amicus 0.986 
Sorrell Respondent Brief 0.986 
Reed Amicus 0.986 
Petitioner Brief 0.985 
Connecticut Amicus 0.985 
RNC Amicus 0.985 
Bradley Amicus 0.984 
McCain Amicus 0.983 
FEC v. McConnell Thomas Dissent Part One 0.983 
Sorrell VRSC Petitioner Brief 0.981 
California Med. Assn. v. FEC Plurality 
Opinion 
0.980 
Equal Justice Amicus 0.980 
Petitioner Reply 0.978 
Dorsen Amicus 0.978 
McConnell Amicus 0.976 
Thomas Concurrence 0.975 
Rehnquist Dissent 0.973 
VPIRG Respondent Brief 0.973 
Buckley Majority Opinion 0.969 
FEC v. McConnell Kennedy Dissent 0.968 
 FEC v. McConnell Majority Parts I and II 0.915 
California Med Assn. v. FEC Blackmun 
Concurrence 
0.887 
National Center for State Courts Amicus 0.887 
Austin v. Michigan Chamber Scalia Dissent 0.863 
McConnell v. FEC Majority Parts III and IV 0.839 
Behrens Amicus 0.839 
Austin v. Michigan Chamber Majority Opinion 0.826 
Austin v. FEC Kennedy Dissent 0.813 
FNB v. Bellotti White Dissent 0.778 
FEC v. NRWC Majority Opinion 0.754 
McConnell v. FEC Scalia Dissent 0.730 
Austin v. Michigan Chamber Brennan 
Concurrence 
0.721 
FNB v. Bellotti Majority Opinion 0.680 
McConnell v. FEC Thomas Dissent Part Two 0.600 
WRTL v. FEC (WRTL I) Majority Opinion 0.486 
McConnell v. FEC Majority Parts III and IV 0.486 
FNB v. Bellotti Rehnquist Dissent 0.486 
McConnell v. FEC Stevens Dissent 0.486 
McConnell v. FEC Majority Part V 0.486 





In this case, there is a tie for the most similar document (Cosine .988) among several 
other opinions from this very case, a dissenting opinion from Justice Thomas in a former 
case, and the amicus brief of the AFL-CIO.   Looking further down the table, it is clear that 
several other briefs and prior opinions are also very close to the target document, as reflected 
by cosines very close to the .988 of the “leading” documents.  This leaves the results for this 
case somewhat inconclusive; while several briefs are very close to the opinion, the same is 
true of dissenting opinions from former cases. As with the inconclusive results shown in 
Table 4-7 above, however, the inconclusive results here also point to some interesting 
findings.  The proximity of Justice Thomas’s dissenting opinion in FEC v. Beaumont is 
worth noting, in that Thomas (who is typically very conservative on campaign finance, as 
with most other issues) dissented from a pro-reform ruling in that case.  Considering that 
Randall v. Sorrell signaled a turn towards a greater willingness to strike down campaign 
finance reform laws, the potential influence of Justice Thomas’s views could be important.  
However, several briefs are tied with Thomas’s dissent, indicating, at least, that several 
litigants were successful in framing issues in ways the Court found agreeable. 
Do Advocates Add New Frames at the Supreme Court? 
The final part of this analysis attempt to discern whether party or amicus briefs are 
adding something novel, in terms of framing, which was not present in the lower court 
opinion that was appealed to the Supreme Court. Lower courts use issue framing as well, and 
it is possible that attorneys simply borrow the language from the lower court in 
characterizing a case, thereby employing the same frames. However, it is also possible that 
attorneys are adding new frames at the Supreme Court stage, especially if they did not like 
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the lower court outcome and are seeking to recharacterize the issues, and thus bring about a 
different result. In order to conduct this analysis, it was necessary to add lower court opinions 
for each Supreme Court campaign finance case to my dataset. For each Supreme Court 
decision, I found the lower court decision that was appealed to the Supreme Court. In most 
cases, this was a United States Circuit Court decision. A few cases were appealed directly 
from a United States District Court, or from a state Supreme Court.  
As stated above, the reason for adding the lower court opinions to the analysis at this 
point is that attorney, and the Supreme Court, may be influenced in the language they use by 
the lower court decision.  The lower court has already analyzed the decision, and to some 
extent defined one particular way of framing the issues. Neither advocates nor the Supreme 
Court are bound to frame the issues in the same way as the lower court.  However, the 
Supreme Court is deciding, in part, whether to affirm or reverse the lower court’s decision.  
Accordingly, both the Court and attorneys will likely consider the lower court’s framing of 
the issues.  However, the Supreme Court stage offers litigants and amici a chance to reframe 
the case in a way that differs from the lower court’s framing.  If a party appeals the lower 
court’s opinion, they may believe they have a greater chance of success if they reframe the 
issues before the Supreme Court. 
I have focused on transitional cases in this analysis, because that is where I expect to 
find the most influence from briefs. Each transitional case—the first case in an era—is when 
the Court is receptive to thinking about campaign finance law in a new way.  The lower 
courts, however, are likely continuing to use issue frames associated with previous cases, as 
they have to follow precedent. Accordingly, I would expect Supreme Court opinions to be 
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most likely to adopt new frames from briefs in transitional cases.  This leads to the following 
hypothesis: 
H1) In transitional cases, the Court will adopt new frames in its opinion that were not present 
in the lower Court opinions.   
 This also leads to a corollary hypotheses. We know from past research that having 
amicus briefs on a party’s side can increase that party’s chances of winning (Collins 2008).  
We would also expect the frames adopted by the Court, if they come from briefs, to come 
from briefs on the winning side—since that is the side whose arguments the Court found 
most convincing. Accordingly, I hypothesize that: 
H2) New frames adopted by the Supreme Court will be found in party or amicus briefs on the 
winning side. 
In order to test these hypotheses, I applied the previously created framing codes to the 
lower court decisions in each transitional case, and created a table for each case displaying 
which documents contained each frame. For each lower court decision, I applied framing 
codes in the same method as with other documents. Using the same framing codes already 
generated, I used Wordstat to find paragraphs in each lower court opinion that contained at 
least three phrases from a given frame. If a paragraph contained at least three phrases from a 
particular frame, I applied that framing code to the paragraph.  
The tables below show the results. The left-hand column displays each frame that is 
present in at least one of the documents in that case.  The columns show the number of times 
each frame is used in a particular document. Comparing the “SCOTUS Majority” (or in one 
case “SCOTUS Plurality”) column with the “Lower Court Majority” Column determines 
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whether a frame is new at the Supreme Court level; if a frame is “new,” it was not adopted by 
the majority lower court opinion. I have also provided columns for frames from party and 
amici briefs filed by each party. Finally, I have marked each column which refers to the 
winning side in a case—whether the column represents the actual parties or supporting 
amici—with a “(W)” in the column title. 
In the previous analysis of transitional cases, I started with Buckley, because there 
was no relevant Supreme Court case prior to the Pre-Buckley era.  Here, however, I begin 
with the U.S. v. UAW-CIO case, since there is a relevant lower court opinion. 
  























3 1 2 8 1 1 
Corruption 
and Speech 
2 0 0 3 2 0 
Corporations 0 
 
0 0 0 6 0 
Influence 0 0 0 1 0 0 
Congressional 
Intent 






In UAW-CIO, the Court adopted one new frame, “corruption and speech”, while also 
employing the “Unions and Corporations” frame used in the lower court.  The “Corruption 
and Speech” came from the winning side, the petitioner, though there were no amici 
supporting that side of the case. Finally, it appears that both parties employed the 
“Corruption and Speech” frame in their briefs; both also used other new frames that were not 
adopted by the Court’s majority opinion. 
The results of Table 4-11 also support Hypothesis 1. The Court adopted a total of 18 
new frames that were not present in the lower court opinion.  However, the most frequently 
used frame, corruption and speech, was present in the lower court opinion. Unexpectedly, the 
winning party (respondent), only raised one new frame, which was used by the Court—
providing some support for the second hypothesis, but only weak support. However, most of 
the new frames appear to not match with frames raised by the advocates at all, indicating that 
those frames came from the Court itself or from sources outside the Court. This is a reminder 
that frames may come from sources other than the Court or advocates, as the Justices are 
aware of the larger political and legal context surrounding the cases they decide. 
Additionally, as the results in subsequent tables below show, the rest of this analysis provides 








Table 4-11: Frames in Buckley v. Valeo Documents 


























25 1 12 20 1 8 11 26 4 3 8 
Public Finance 4 0 0 3 0 0 0 3 0 1 0 
 Invidious 
Discrimination 
4 0 1 3 0 0 0 25 0 2 1 
Congressional 
Intent 
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Public Debate 2 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Disclosure 2 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 
Unions and 
Corporations 
1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
Influence 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Discussion of 
Candidates 
1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
Limits on 
Association 
1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Congressional 
Power 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
War Chest 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
Issues and 
Candidates 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Compelled 
Disclosure 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Dissemination 
of Ideas 




1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Personal 
Wealth 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Effective 
Advocacy 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Improper 
Commitment 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Association 
and Speech 




1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Public Money 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Representative 
Government 
4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Free 
Expression 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Relative Voice 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Equal 
Protection 


































9 3 16 6 3 38 24 38 146 125 
Representative 
Government 
2 0 1 0 1 3 1 1 14 0 
Limits on 
Association 
2 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 4 
Political 
Communication 
1 0 2 0 0 1 0 0 11 2 
Effective 
Advocacy 
1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 8 1 
Congressional 
Judgment 




1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
Free 
Expression 
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 4 
Association and 
Speech 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 
War Chest 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
Public Finance 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Corporations 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
Public Debate 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 5 
Invidious 
Discrimination 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
Public Money 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Unions and 
Corporations 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Free Discussion 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Discussion of 
Candidates 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Improper 
Commitment 












In Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, the “Corruption and Speech” was still 
the most common frame, but the Court also adopted five new frames: Representative 
Government, Limits on Association, Political Communication, Congressional Judgment, and 
Broad Prophylactic Rule.  This supports the first hypothesis. Additionally, all of the new 
frames were employed by either the petitioner or amici supporting petitioner, the winning 
side in this case. This result provides some support for hypothesis two.  It should also be 
noted that in some cases the respondent also employed the new frames used by the 
petitioners or their amici. This is likely because the respondents, as the term suggests, are 
responding to arguments made by the petitioner.  While they may (and often do) raise 
arguments of their own, they likely feel compelled to address some of petitioner’s arguments, 
resulting in similarities in framing. 
Table 4-13 again offers support for the first hypothesis; the plurality opinion (there 
was no majority opinion in this case) adopts two new frames, Political Communication and 
Dissemination of Ideas. Additionally, both these frames were raised by the winning side 

















































12 5 6 53 18 38 17 39 34 110 
Political 
Communication 
2 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 1 
Effective 
Advocacy 
1 0 0 2 1 5 0 0 1  
Dissemination of 
Ideas 
1 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 1 
Free Expression 0 0 0  0 1 1 0 3 3 
Representative 
Government 
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Coordinated 
Expenditure 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 
Discussion of 
Candidates 
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 
Invidious 
Discrimination 




0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
Public Finance 0 0 1 5 1 5 1 5 0 8 
Congressional 
Judgment 
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 3 
Corporations 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 2 
Confidence in 
Government 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 
Public Debate 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 
Compelled 
Disclosure 
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
Issues and 
Candidates 




0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
Association and 
Speech 







 For further support of the hypothesis that the Court adopts new frames in transitional 
cases, see tables 4-14 and 4-15 below. Table 4-14 consolidates all non-transitional cases into 
one table, showing whether a frame was also present in a lower court case. Of the 35 frames 
used in non-transitional cases, 10 of them were “new”—not used in lower court majority 
opinions. So new frames do appear in non-transitional cases, but they constitute less than one 
third of the frames present. Table 4-15, by contrast, shows all transitional cases in one table, 
indicating whether a frame came from a lower court majority opinion or not. (I have left out 
briefs from this table, and consolidated all types of lower court opinions into one column).  
Of the 26 different frames used in transitional cases, seventeen of them—over half are new 
frames.  This points to a much greater use of new frames in transitional cases than in non-
transitional cases. 
 On the whole, these results confirm the presence of new frames in transitional 
cases, offering support from each case for the first hypothesis. This supports the notion, 
discussed earlier in the study, that the four eras are distinct in terms of how the Court treats 
campaign finance legislation and in how the Court frames the issues. When the Court’s 
overall view of campaign finance changes, the way it talks about the issue changes. 
Therefore, the Court is receptive to new ideas in times of doctrinal change, and these ideas 
are expressed in terms of issue framing. In times of change, the Court is especially likely to 
use new frames in a particular case that do not come from the lower court decision in a given 
case. While many of these new frames come from the court itself, as in the case of Buckley v. 
Valeo, many also come from party or amicus briefs. This indicates, then, that advocates do 




Table 4-14:  Frames in Non-Transitional Cases 






Political Communication 3 2 0 
Dissemination of Ideas 2 0 0 
Public Debate 3 0 5 
Discussion of Candidates 2 0 0 
Equal Protection 1 0 2 
Improper Commitment 7 1 3 
Real and Apparent Corruption 2 0 0 
Corruption and Speech 94 17 123 
Big Money 4 0 0 
Public Finance 30 0 20 
Personal Wealth 4 0 1 
Coordinated Expenditure 9 3 5 
Association and Speech 1 1 2 
Limits on Association 5 0 1 
Disclosure 1 0 1 
Compelled Disclosure 3 0 2 
Advocacy Corporation 2 0 2 
Corporations 24 2 20 
Electioneering Communication 25 4 16 
Unions and Corporations 11 0 23 
Corporate and Union Advantage 1 0 1 
Legislative Judgment 4 0 1 
PAC 2 0 0 
Confidence in Government 2 0 1 
Representative Government 3 1 4 
Public Money 1 0 3 
Free Expression 5 0 0 
Issues and Candidates 2 2 2 
Narrow Construction 2 0 0 
Influence 2 0 2 
Express Advocacy 3 2 4 
Congressional Intent 2 0 0 
Substantial Relationship 1 0 0 
Business 3 0 2 













2 2 0 
Dissemination of Ideas 1 1 0 
Public Debate 2 0 1 
Discussion of 
Candidates 
1 0 0 
Improper 
Commitment 
1 0 0 
Real and Apparent 
Corruption 
1 0 0 
Corruption and Speech 36 12 79 
Broad Prophylactic 
Rule 
1 0 0 
War Chest 1 0 0 
Public Finance 4 0 8 
Personal Wealth 1 0 0 
Effective Advocacy 2 1 3 
Association and Speech 1 0 0 
Limits on Association 3 0 0 
Disclosure 2 0 1 
Compelled Disclosure 1 0 0 
Invidious 
Discrimination 
4 0 3 
Unions and 
Corporations 
4 0 3 
Representative 
Government 
6 0 1 
Congressional Power 1 0 0 
Public Money 2 0 0 
Free Expression 1 0 0 
Relative Voice 1 0 0 
Issues and Candidates 1 0 0 
Influence 2 0 0 
Congressional 
Judgment 






 Initially, this chapter shows that the four eras of campaign finance law are 
distinguishable not only in terms of votes, but in terms of issue framing.  With regard to the 
success of issue framing on the part of litigants, however, the evidence is less conclusive.  
Campaign finance cases that went against the grain in their respective era were not more 
likely to show similarities to briefs than those that followed the trend of their era.  
Additionally, two out of three transitional cases show greater similarities in issue framing 
with briefs than opinions.  This could indicate a greater role of framing effects from briefs at 
the beginning of those two eras.  The transitional case from the deregulation era, however, 
showed as much similarity to a prior dissenting opinion as to various briefs.  This 
inconclusive result leaves open the question of whether the Court was influenced by issue 
framing in the briefs, or reached back to a prior opinion for definition of the issues—or 
whether both played a role.8 
 However, the most significant result from the chapter was the finding that the Court is 
likely to adopt frames in transitional cases that do not come from the lower Court decision. 
This indicates that advocates, to some extent, are succeeding in reframing cases in the 
                                               
8 I examined one other characteristic of transitional cases—the discord on the Court.  In this case, I examined 
the last case in each era (except for Deregulation) to determine whether there were concurring or dissenting 
opinions.  The presence of concurring or dissenting opinions in the final case in an era could indicate that the 
Court is beginning to lose a consensus that has defined that era with regard to the treatment of campaign 
finance cases.  This would also provide some indication that the Court itself is moving, rather than being 
moved by advocates.  The results were inconclusive, however.  In the first three eras, the final case in each era 
had not concurring or dissenting opinions.  On the other hand, concurring and dissenting opinions were more 
likely to appear in the most important cases in each era, possibly showing that discord manifests itself when 
the stakes are particularly high.  Again, these results are inconclusive, but might merit further research. 
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transitional periods. This finding also lends support to the separation of campaign finance 
law into four different eras, as we can observe the change that is occurring at the beginning 






















Chapter 5:  Conclusion 
 
This dissertation has attempted to explain the role of legal argument and issue 
framing in the development of the Supreme Court’s campaign finance jurisprudence.  The 
general goal of the study has been to understand the role legal argument plays in the Court’s 
decision-making, but the study focused on campaign finance law in order to gain certain 
advantages of conducting a small scale study.  While large scale studies may generate more 
generalizable conclusions, a study of a specific issue area allows tracing the use of specific 
arguments and issue frames across time, and in general allows one to make a closer 
examination of opinion content.   
The most important results in this dissertation are found in Chapter 4. In Chapter 2, I 
had theorized that the campaign finance cases could be divided into four distinct eras which 
could be characterized by how deferential or skeptical the Court was toward campaign 
finance legislation. Not only did I expect the eras to be distinct in terms of votes, but in terms 
of language used, which would be reflected in the way the court and attorneys frame the 
issues. The use of frames in both the briefs and opinions provided support for my expectation 
that the four eras are distinct, while also showing that certain frames persist over time.  
Most notably, the “corruption and speech” frame was persistently important after 
Buckley v. Valeo, indicating how legal precedent affects framing. Because this was 
established early on as an important legal concern, courts continually returned to the problem 
of balancing freedom of speech concerns with legitimate state interest in combating 
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corruption. Additionally, advocates continually addressed these concerns in their briefs, 
because it was clear that this frame was important in the Court’s understanding of the issues. 
On the other hand, certain frames are more important in some eras than others, indicating that 
the Court and advocates emphasized certain aspects of the cases more than others in 
particular eras. For example, the “unions and corporations” frames, involving concerns about 
the influence of both unions and corporations, became less prevalent over time, while the 
“corporations” frame, reflecting concern only about corporate influence, became more 
prevalent over time. The “Limits on Association” frame, concerning the limitations on 
freedom of political association, was primarily found in the New Deference period, when the 
Court was more willing to uphold campaign finance legislation.  
The findings regarding stability and change of framing across eras make for an 
especially interesting result, in that they offer empirical support for expectations derived from 
my reading of traditional doctrinal analysis. These results should be of great interest to those 
who believe that the language of court decisions matters, but also seek to understand that 
language through empirical, rather than interpretive, analysis. It also indicates that traditional 
legal analysis and empirical methods of analyzing language may reinforce one another. 
Chapter 4 also contained the important finding that advocates can add frames at the 
Supreme Court stage that were not present in the case in lower court decisions in the same 
case. This is especially noteworthy in that it suggests that advocates can be successful in 
increasing the salience of certain aspects of issues. On the one hand, this analysis does not 
definitively answer the causal question of where new frames ultimately come from. It always 
possible that a justice emphasizes a new frame because of something in the broader political 
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or legal environment.  Furthermore, definitively tracing this kind of causation may be 
impossible without access to some documentation of a justice’s thought process, such as 
memos circulated in the court or their own private papers, and even then these sources are 
not guaranteed to be reliable.  However, this analysis does show that new frames raised by 
advocates are sometimes reflected in Court opinions. Accordingly, even if justices are 
motivated by other sources-their own understanding of precedent, ideology or policy goals, 
concern for other political actors—it may well be worthwhile for lawyers to attempt to 
influence the Court through framing effects. Even if the predominant frames in a particular 
era tend to favor one side or the other in a case, the new frames that are introduced by 
advocates may make their way into opinions. This reflects Riker’s (1986) theory of 
heresthetics and Wedeking’s (2010) findings that parties before the Supreme Court may 
affect their chances of a favorable outcome through their choice of framing. While parties to 
a case primarily want to win, they also want to win future cases in lower courts or the 
Supreme Court on the same subject. In order to do so, establishing favorable legal doctrine is 
important. By strategically employing issue framing, advocates can bring new concerns to 
the Court’s attention, and are not limited to the issue frames established in lower courts. 
These frames may subsequently become important in future cases before the Supreme Court 
or in lower courts. 
The analysis in Chapter 2 also contained important findings about the court’s use of 
language and treatment of argument. This chapter did not rely on framing analysis, but 
examined more explicit treatment of arguments made by advocates. I concluded that the 
Court devotes more attention in its opinions to arguments it ultimately rejects than those 
which it agrees with.  An analysis of whose arguments the Court addresses in opinions also 
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showed that opinions devote much more attention to party arguments than amici arguments.  
This was expected, as the Court likely feels somewhat compelled to deal with the arguments 
made by actual parties to the case. 
Chapter Three examined cases in which justices changed their minds on an issue, and 
looked for linguistic similarities between the opinions explaining those changed positions 
and briefs which might have persuaded the justices.  However, there was little evidence of 
similarity between the briefs and the justices’ stated reasoning in these instances.  As 
discussed in Chapter 3, these negative findings could indicate that the justices did not change 
their minds because of arguments made by attorneys, and this is an interesting finding. It 
could be that justices change their minds for a number of other reasons, such as simply 
reconsidering the issues, influence of their colleagues, or influence from the external political 
environment. Additionally, the negative findings could reflect the limitations in my 
methodology in this chapter. It may well be that the justices’ changing positions were 
influenced by arguments in briefs, but not reflected in the use of particular language from 
those influential briefs. The type of analysis done in this chapter might be worth more 
investigation with other methods of content analysis that can detect similarity of meaning in 
different words, rather than simply looking for repetition of the same language. 
Nevertheless, the results of Chapters two and four taken together provide strong 
evidence that the court’s use of language, as well as the Court’s vote results, are a defining 
characteristic of cases in particular time periods.  As discussed earlier, this supports work by 
other authors on regime theory, which argues that various legal regimes establish doctrinal 
concerns that help shape case outcomes along with other factors such as judicial policy 
preferences.   
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The finding that new frames used by advocates can appear in the Court’s opinions 
merits further research. Given this finding, the next obvious step to further this research is to 
determine what factors cause a justice to incorporate certain frames into their opinion. If they 
are drawing new frames from briefs, are better or more experienced advocates more likely to 
have their new frames adopted? The more powerful and well-funded interest groups might 
also have an advantage here, although that advantage might manifest itself primarily in the 
ability to hire better attorneys. Or justices might be drawing new frames from groups whose 
ideological views they share. This would not necessarily indicate that justices’ decisions are 
purely the product of political ideology, but would indicate that ideologically motivated 
groups might have a chance to influence doctrine by appealing to justices likely to agree with 
their framing of an issue.  
The results also suggest certain limitations of the study, although those limitations 
might be overcome with further research. As previously mentioned, this type of analysis 
cannot address the ultimate causal question of the source of a frame, but can determine the 
extent to which frames used in briefs are reflected in opinions.  
However, this limitation suggests a possibility for further research, which is to test the 
longevity of new frames. Some frames clearly are prominent in all eras; others may only be 
important to one or two. But, since individual frames can be traced across different cases, it 
should be possible to determine whether a new frame employed by an advocate and adopted 
by the Court appears in subsequent cases, thus having a long-term impact. Some political 
scientists and other scholars interested in the flow of policy ideas over time have begun to 
trace this phenomenon in legislation through the technique of “text reuse,” showing that 
specific policies contained in legislation (or proposed legislation) may resurface in later 
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legislation (Wilkerson et al., 2014; Smith et al. 2014).  Similarly, frames that persist over 
time may also evolve. A change in emphasis from one frame to another might not reflect a 
change in emphasis so much as a change in the language used to emphasize a particular 
concern. This phenomenon could be further examined through content analysis using 
dynamic topic models (Blei 2006). 
On the whole this dissertation makes an important contribution to our understanding 
of the Supreme Court in that it suggests the use of language by both the Court and advocates 
can be understood in terms of framing. The Court’s use of frames exemplifies both the 
stability of some doctrinal concerns over time, and the presence of other doctrinal 
distinctions across time that reflect changes in the Court’s view of the same issue over time. 
The finding that new frames raised by advocates at the Supreme Court stage sometimes make 
their way into opinions is also empirical evidence of the potential for advocates to have an 
effect on the language of Court decisions, although the further research suggested above will 
be necessary to fully develop this finding. While advancing our understanding of the Court, 





Appendix 2-1:  West Keyword Topics 
 
92 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
92XVII Political Rights and Discrimination 
92k1469 k. Campaign finance, contributions, and expenditures. 
92k1469 k. Campaign finance, contributions, and expenditures. 
 
92 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
92XVIII Freedom of Speech, Expression, and Press 
92XVIII(F) Politics and Elections 
92 1697 Contributions 
92k1698 k. In general. 
 
92 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
92XVIII Freedom of Speech, Expression, and Press 
92XVIII(F) Politics and Elections 
92 1697 Contributions 
92k1700 k. Corporate contributions. 
 
92 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
92XVIII Freedom of Speech, Expression, and Press 
92XVIII(F) Politics and Elections 
92 1702 Expenditures 
92k1704 k. Limitations on amounts. 
 
92 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
92XVIII Freedom of Speech, Expression, and Press 
92XVIII(F) Politics and Elections 
92 1702 Expenditures 
92k1707 k. Corporate expenditures. 
 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
92XVIII Freedom of Speech, Expression, and Press 
92XVIII(F) Politics and Elections 
92 1702 Expenditures 











Appendix 2-2:  List of Campaign Finance Cases 
 
United States v. UAW-CIO 
 352 U.S. 567, 77 S.Ct. 529 (1957). 
 
Cort v. Ash 
422 U.S. 66, 95 S.Ct. 2080 (1975) 
 
Buckley v. Valeo 
424 U.S. 1, 96 S.Ct. 612 (1976) 
 
First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti 
435 U.S. 765, 98 S.Ct. 1407 (1978). 
 
California Medical Association v. Federal Election Commission 
453 U.S. 182, 101 S.Ct. 2712 (1981). 
 
Federal Election Commission v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee 
454 U.S. 27, 102 S.Ct. 38 (1981). 
 
Citizens Against Rent Control/Coalition for Fair Housing v. City of Berkeley 
454 U.S. 290, 102 S.Ct. 434 (1981). 
 
BREAD Political Action Committee v. Federal Election Commission 
455 U.S. 577, 102 S.Ct. 1235 (1982). 
 
Brown v. Socialist Workers ’74 Campaign Committee (Ohio) 
459 U.S. 87, 103 S.Ct. 416 (1982). 
 
Federal Election Commission v. National Right to Work Committee 
459 U.S. 197, 103 S.Ct. 552 (1982). 
 
Federal Election Com'n v. National Conservative Political Action Committee 
470 U.S. 480, 105 S.Ct. 1459 (1985). 
 
Federal Election Commission v. Massachusetts Citizens For Life, Inc. 
479 U.S. 238, 107 S.Ct. 616 (1986). 
 
Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce 
494 U.S. 652, 110 S.Ct. 1391 (1990). 
 
Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee v. Federal Election Commission 
518 U.S. 604, 116  S.Ct. 2309 (1996). 
 
Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC 




Federal Election Commission v. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee 
533 U.S. 431, 121 S.Ct. 2351 (2001). 
 
McConnell v. Federal Election Commission 
540 U.S. 93, 124 S.Ct. 619 (2003). 
 
Federal Election Commission v. Beaumont 
539 U.S. 146, 123 S.Ct. 2200 (2003). 
 
Randall v. Sorrell 
548 U.S. 230, 126 S.Ct. 2479 (2006). 
 
Wisconsin v. Right to Life, Inc., v. Federal Election Commission 
546 U.S. 410, 126 S.Ct. 1016 (2006). 
 
Federal Election Commission v. Wisconsin Right To Life, Inc. 
551 U.S. 449, 127 S.Ct. 2652 (2007). 
 
Davis v. Federal Election Commission 
554 U.S. 724, 128 S.Ct. 2759 (2008). 
 
Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission 
130 S.Ct. 876 (2010). 
 
Arizona Free Enterprise Club’s Freedom Club PAC, et al., v. Bennett. 
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Appendix 3-1:  Codebook for Chapter Three Analysis 
1) Justice 
    String variable with Justice’s last name 
 
2) Date 
    Date decision issued.  Format is YYYYMMDD 
 
3) Style of Case 
 
4)  U.S. Cite 
       
5)  Era (see divisions from Chapter 2) 
 0=Pre-Buckley 
 1=Buckley 
 2=New Deference 
 3=Deregulation 
 










8)  Issue area  
1= Contribution Limits 
2=Spending Limits 
3=Jurisdiction (including standing, mootness, ripeness) 
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4=Authority of FEC 





9)  Ideology:  Martin-Quinn score for justice during term of that vote 














13) Issue Identifier 
Unique identifier for each issue consisting of name of one of the parties to the case followed 
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Appendix 4-2: List of Campaign Finance Frames, with Phrases in each Frame 
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